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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: 
RICHARD K. CRANDALL Case No. 88-0325 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented in this case are as follows: 
(a) Did Respondent improperly default Appellant 
resulting in the facts as alleged in the 
Complaints in these matters being improperly 
deemed as being admitted by Appellant? 
(b) Did Respondent fail to give Appellant proper 
notice of the disciplinary Hearing in these 
matters? 
(c) Did Respondent fail to give Appellant proper 
notice of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law of the Hearing Panel in these matters, thus 
denying Appellant's right to make his objection to 
the Bar Commission prior to the submission of its 
Recommendation to this Court? 
(d) Should Respondent be estopped from asserting 
jurisdiction to discipline Appellant after having 
dropped Appellant from the rolls of attorneys 
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and 
after having refused to re-enroll Appellant after 
his dues were properly tendered? 
(e) Did Respondent deny Appellant his right to counsel 
by (i) withholding and refusing to serve notice 
upon counsel of pending disciplinary matters 
against Appellant, (ii) subsequently improperly 
requesting the withdrawal of counsel, and (iii) 
refusing Appellant's request for a short 
continuance to obtain new counsel? 
(f) Was Respondent denied his right to appeal in F-
239, F-276 by the premature entry of this Courts 
Order of Discipline nineteen days after it was 
filed with this court in direct contravention of 
Section 78-51-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended? 
(g) Were Bar Counsels direct misrepresentations or 
omissions of material facts made to the Hearing 
Panel evidence bad faith and unfairness so as to 
deny Appellant his right to due process? 
(i) Are all of the above taken together sufficient to 
find unfairness in the proceedings upon which the 
recommendation of disbarment is based? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an Appeal from a Recommendation of Discipline: 
Disbarment in Formal Complaints F-300, F-307, and F-311, entered 
and filed with this court on or about September 6, 1988, by the 
Board of Bar Commissioners of the Utah State Bar Association. 
The Recommendation repeatedly refers to and relies 
upon all prior Disciplinary matter against Appellant,namely F-
202, F-239, and F-276 and Appellant will also address those 
matters in his brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Richard K. Crandall, hereinafter referred to 
as "Mr. Crandall" or "Crandall," was admitted to practice law in 
the State of Utah in February of 1976. In May of 1986 Crandall 
was engaged in the practice of law as a solo practitioner 
specializing in contested divorce cases. Mr. Crandall had 
offices at 350 South 400 East, Suite 114, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(See Appendix II, Affidavit of R. Crandall). 
In May, 1987, Crandall had approximately 100 open and 
active matters involving daily court appearances, weekly trials 
and the continuous filing of pleadings. Including divorce 
complaints, orders to show cause, restraining orders, etc. 
(See Appendix II, Affidavit of R. Crandall) 
Since being admitted to the Bar in 1976, Mr. Crandall 
has been the subject of six bar complaints: F-202, F-239, F-276, 
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F-300, F-307 and F-311. All six of which Complaints are 
specifically and repeatedly referred to in the Recommendation 
presently under appeal. (R. pp.74, 124-125, 169, 173-174) The 
Complaint in F-202 had been completed shortly before April of 
1987. In F-202, Mr. Crandall was placed on a supervised 
probation and was ordered to file monthly reports on his current 
files. The first report was due sometime in the later part of 
May, 1987. (Appendix II, Affidavit R. Crandall) 
On May 15, 1987, Mr. Crandall received a letter from 
the Utah State Bar stating that he had been dropped from the 
rolls of attorneys authorized to practice law for failure to 
tender his 1987 annual dues. (See Addendum. II p. 1). Upon 
receipt of this letter, Mr. Crandall initially contacted his 
bookkeeper and inquired why his dues had not been paid. 
Crandall's bookkeeper stated that he had just recently tendered 
his dues. Mr. Crandall then called Mr. Steven Hutchinson and 
informed Mr. Hutchinson, the Executive Director of the Bar that 
it was Crandall's understanding that the dues had been tendered 
by his bookkeeper. Mr. Hutchinson explained that they would 
check the records and see if in fact mislaid the check or if 
there was some misunderstanding.(See Addendum II, Affidavit of 
Richard K. Crandall. 
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There was no discussion regarding Mr. Crandall's 
ability to handle his pending matters while the dues problem was 
resolved. Approximately two or three days later Mr. Crandall 
left town on a scheduled vacation to extend over the Memorial Day 
weekend. Upon his return from vacation Mr. Crandall was informed 
by his secretary and his court runner that several pleadings Mr. 
Crandall had left for filing had been rejected by the courts upon 
instructions from the Utah State Bar Association. Mr. Crandall 
immediately telephoned the Clerk of the Third District Court who 
stated that they had received a list of attorneys who had been 
dropped from the rolls of attorneys authorized to practice law in 
the State of Utah and had been specifically instructed by the Bar 
Association not to accept pleadings from the listed attorneys. 
(See, Addendum II, Affidavit of R.K. Crandall) 
Mr. Crandall immediately contacted the Bar Association, 
discovered that Mr. Hutchinson was out of town, and asked to 
speak to Bar Counsel. Mr. Crandall explained to Bar Counsel that 
it was his understanding that his dues had been tendered. Bar 
Counsel explained that they had not been located. Crandall then 
offered to immediately tender said dues. Bar Counsel stated that 
under the new policies adopted by the Bar Commission the matter 
would have to be presented to the Executive Committee of the Bar 
Association together with a written petition for reinstatement. 
(Appendix II p. 2) Crandall asked when the next Executive 
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Committee meeting was to be held and was informed it was sometime 
in the later part of June. Mr. Crandall explained that he had 
many court appearances in the interim and actually reviewed his 
coming calendar with Bar Counsel. Bar Counsel explained that 
there was nothing that could be done under the Rules. Mr. 
Crandall explained that it would create all kinds of chaos with 
his clients. The only response offered by Bar Counsel was to 
take another vacation. (See, Appendix II, Affidavit of 
R.Crandall) . 
Mr. Crandall immediately obtained continuances of those 
most immediate hearings and explained to clients about his 
suspension. Mr. Crandall was told by the Utah Bar Admissions 
Secretary that the tendering of dues was a mechanical matter and 
there should be no problem on his reinstatement as soon as the 
Executive Committee met. Before the next scheduled Executive 
Committee meeting, Mr. Crandall tendered the payment of his dues 
together with the photocopy of the check originally tendered, a 
written petition and letter of explanation from his bookkeeper. 
(Appendix II, Affidavit R. Crandall). 
On or about July 9, 1987, Mr. Crandall received a 
letter from Julie Smiley, the Admissions Secretary of the Bar 
Association stating that the Executive Committee had referred his 
petition for reinstatement to the entire Commission and that the 
Commission would meet on or about July 31. (Appendix II, p. 3) 
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Immediately thereafter, Crandallrs secretary called in sick and 
never returned to work. Mr. Crandall immediately contacted all 
clients that had all matters pending prior to July 31, 1987, and 
explained that he was still under administrative suspension. At 
this point Crandall's practice became chaotic. Many clients were 
asking were asking for full refunds even though the fees were 
earned and the client actually owed Mr. Crandall money. (Appendix 
II, Affidavit R. Crandall) 
On August 5, 1987, Mr. Crandall received another letter 
from the Bar Association stating without further explanation that 
the matter had been deferred to the next Bar Commission meeting 
at the end of August, 1987. (Appendix II, p.4). Several days 
later, Mr. Crandall received an Order to Show Cause in F-202 
requiring him to appear and show cause why his probation should 
not be revoked for failing to file status reports on his cases, 
all of which status reports were due after his dues suspension. 
(Appendix II, p. 5). 
Said Order to Show Cause was scheduled for August 21, 
1987. Although he was losing cases on a daily basis and his 
practice was in chaos, Mr. Crandall completed a case summary and 
submitted it to his supervisor Joseph Palmer sometime in the 
middle of August and prior to the hearing on the Order to Show 
Cause. (Appendix II, Affidavit R. Crandall). 
On August 15, 1987, a creditor of Crandall's who was 
aware that his practice was in chaos and without notice to Mr. 
Crandall entered his premises and repossessed all of his office 
furniture, and equipment. Sometime in August Crandall's 
automobile was repossessed. (Appendix, Affidavit R. Crandall). 
On August 21, 1987, Mr. Crandall appeared before the 
hearing panel in F-202, together with his Attorney, Bruce Cohne, 
to show cause why his probation in F-202 should not be revoked 
because he had failed to file monthly reports. Appearing as 
Associate Bar Counsel was Christine Burdick. At this hearing Mr. 
Crandall became emotional and tearfully stated to Ms. Burdick, 
(i) that his life was in a state of chaos, (ii) that the dues 
suspension had ruined his law practice, and (iii) that he was so 
overwhelmed by the effects of the dues suspension that he 
literally hadn't had the time or ability to summarize client 
files that he was frantically referring other counsel. (Appendix 
II, Affidavit R. Crandall) 
Mr. Crandall stated directly to Ms. Burdick, that he 
felt the Bar had wrongfully delayed consideration of his 
tendering of dues and that this was in violation of the Bar's 
Procedures of Discipline. The panel recommended suspension for 
six months retroactive to the time of the dues suspension on May 
1, 1987, and terminating on November 4, 1987. The Recommendation 
of the Hearing Panel in F-202 that Crandall should file a 
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business plan demonstrating an "ability to reengage in the 
practice of law" (R.33) was clearly based on the fact that 
Crandall had been completely driven from his practice by the dues 
suspension. Mr. Cohne volunteered to supervise Crandall's 
probation in F-202. Bar Counsel approved of Mr. Cohne as 
supervisor without comment. Further, at this hearing Bar Counsel 
mentioned nothing about there being any other formal or informal 
disciplinary matters pending against Mr. Crandall. (Appendix II, 
Affidavit R. Crandall). 
On or about October 18, 1987, Mr. Cohne withdrew as 
counsel for Mr. Crandall at specific the request of Bar Counsel. 
Immediately upon the withdrawal of Mr. Cohne, and with less than 
ten days notice to Mr. Crandall, Bar Counsel scheduled 
disciplinary hearings in F-239 and F-276 for November 2, 1987. 
Having just received the Notice of Hearing on the afternoon 
before or the morning of the hearing, Mr. Crandall called Bar 
Counsel Ms. Burdick and asked about the nature of the Hearing. 
Bar Counsel stated to Mr. Crandall that it was a Hearing to 
recommend discipline in F-239 and F-276. She further stated that 
she intended to request a one year suspension on each matter. 
(Appendix II, Affidavit R. Crandall). 
Mr. Crandall told Associate Bar Counsel Burdick that he 
had just received the notice of the Hearing and notice that Mr. 
Cohne, his attorney, had withdrawn as his counsel. He then asked 
- Q -
Bar Counsel to continue the matter for a few days to allow him 
time to get a new lawyer and prepare for the hearing. Bar 
Counsel refused, stating that she would not continue the hearing 
since the screening panel had been notified and that it was 
difficult finding a date when they all could appear and that it 
was too late to change the date. Mr. Crandall stated that he 
would call the members of panel himself and get a new date as 
quickly as possible and stated to Bar Counsel that given the 
purposed recommendation, he felt his request was not 
unreasonable. Bar Counsel's response was that she had just sent 
Mr. Crandall a letter giving him notice of an informal complaint 
she had received from John Clay,(R. 284) and that she intended to 
seek disbarment on that matter. Mr. Crandall then asked Bar 
Counsel to at least present his request for a continuance because 
he was without transportation (R. 215) and needed time to obtain 
new counsel. The conversation was terminated with Bar Counsel 
refusing all of Crandall's requests. Contrary to repeated 
representations made by Ms. Burdick to the Hearing Panel in this 
matter (R. 228-229), this was the only conversation Mr. Crandall 
has ever had with Ms. Burdick, except during his appearance at 
the F-202 Show Cause Hearing in F-202 as set forth above. The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of the 
Hearing Panel in F-239 and F-276 were mailed to Crandall on 
December 2, 1987, ten days after they had already been considered 
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by the Board of Bar Commissioners. (Appendix II, p.6-7). On 
December 2, 1987, the Board of Bar Commissioners entered their 
Recommendations for Discipline in F-239 and F-276 and transmitted 
these Recommendations to this Court on that date. (Appendix II, 
pp. 6-7). The files and records of this Court disclose that a 
hearing on these matters was scheduled on December 21, 1987. The 
files and records of this Court further reflect that Bar Counsel, 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale was given notice of this hearing but no such 
notice was sent to Mr. Crandall. On December 21, 1987, this 
Court entered it's Order of Discipline in F-202, F-239 and F-276, 
only nineteen days after they were submitted to this Court. (R. 
pp. 32-43) The Order of Discipline in F-276 was mailed to one 
Stanley S. Adams at an address unfamiliar to Crandall. (Appendix 
II, p. 8) The Orders of Discipline in F-202 and F-239 were 
mailed to Crandall at 547 West 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and was returned undelivered. (Appendix II, p. 9-10) Mr. 
Crandall never received this Court's Orders in F-202, F-239 or F-
276. The first notice Mr. Crandall received of the discipline 
imposed in these matters was provided by a fellow attorney who 
gave Mr. Crandall a copy of the notice published in the February 
(THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE WAS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK) 
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or March, 1988, Bar Association Newsletter. At this time Mr. 
Crandall was without employment and he was in bankruptcy. 
Next, the Summons and Complaint in F-300 was mailed by 
Certified Mail to Crandall at 547 West 3900 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on November 17, 1987, and was signed for by someone 
other than Crandall (R. 1-5) and was not received by Crandall. 
The Summonses and Complaints in F-307 and F-311 were 
mailed on or about March 3, 1988, to the 547 West 3900 South 
Address. These Summonses and Complaints were returned to 
Respondent undelivered.(R. 84, 135). 
On March 31, 1988, Constable Betty Bates personally 
served the Summonses and Complaints in F-307 and F-311 upon Mr. 
Crandall (R. 16-17). On April 4, 1988, only four days after the 
personal service of the Summonses and Complaints in F-307 and F-
311 Respondent entered Crandall's defaults in these matters (R. 
87) Bar Counsel's Motion to Consolidate, Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Consolidate, and the Order of Consolidation were all 
mailed by regular mail to 547 West 3900 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and not received by Crandall (R. 26-43). 
As is clearly evident from Paragraph 1 of the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of Discipline of 
the Hearing Panel (R. 45-62), that Respondent relies on this 
personal service as it's notice of service upon Crandall of the 
Complaints in F-307 and F-311. 
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Respondent received the service return showing actual 
personal service upon Crandall on March 31, 1988. Respondent 
also knew that Crandall had not received the Summons and 
Complaints that were previously mailed to Crandall at the 547 
West 3900 South address because Respondent's Certified Mail was 
returned as undelivered. It should be noted that the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of the Hearing Panel 
upon which the Bar Commission bases its recommendation, 
presumably prepared by Bar Counsel, are carefully worded. While 
specifically relying on the fact that Crandall was personally 
served in F-307 and F-311, the actual dates of service and the 
date Crandall's default was entered are omitted. By comparison, 
all other similar Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
prepared by the same Bar Counsel in prior proceedings instituted 
against Crandall, very specifically set forth dates of service 
and dates of default. If one merely modifies Paragraph 1 of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations of the 
Hearing Panel to include the date of service and default, the 
error becomes glaring. 
On or about March 3, 1988, Respondent mailed a Notice 
of Hearing in F-300 to Crandall at 547 West 3900 South Address 
and it was returned undelivered (R. 12-13). On April 14, 1988, 
Respondent mailed Notices of Hearing in F-307 and F-311 to 
Crandall at the 547 West 3900 South address . Both of these 
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Notices of Hearing were returned undelivered. (R. 89-90, 140-
141). On the face of the Notice in F-311, below Crandall's 
name, there is a hand written notation "3818 East Timberline Dr." 
(R. 142). This was Crandall's home address, which address had 
long been in the Bar Association's files. On May 6, 1987, 
Constable Bates served this Notice of Hearing, in F-311 only/ on 
Crandall at his residence at 3818 East Timberline. (R. 144). 
On July 11, 1988, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Recommendation of the Hearing Panel were entered by the 
Hearing Panel (R. 62). On July 19, 1988, the Findings, 
Conclusions and Recommendation was mailed to Crandall at the 547 
West 3900 South Address and again returned undelivered (R. 63). 
On August 15, 1988, the Board of Bar Commissioners entered it's 
Recommendation of Discipline based upon the Hearing Panel's 
Recommendation. However, the Commission specifically modified 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations of 
the Hearing Panel to specifically provide in the Commission's 
Recommendations for restitution of $15,000 in the prior F-276 
disciplinary proceeding (R. 67-68). 
On August 18, 1988, Constable Bates personally served 
Mr. Crandall with the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of the Hearing Panel, not the Commission's 
Recommendation of Discipline, at his residence on Timberline 
Drive. (R. 71). 
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On August 22, 1988, Bar Counsel mailed a copy of the 
Recommendation of Discipline of Bar Commission addressed to 
Crandall at the 547 West 3900 South address. The Bar Commissions 
Recommendation of Discipline was also returned to the Respondent 
undelivered. (R. 73). Also, on August 22, 1988, Bar Counsel 
transmitted the Bar Commission's Recommendation to this Court. 
On September 15, 1988, the Clerk of this Court mailed a 
letter addressed to Crandall at the 547 West 3900 South address 
advising him, among other things, that an appeal to the 
Recommendation of the Board of Bar Commissioners should be filed 
not later than September 21, 1988. This letter was returned 
undelivered. (See the files of this Court in this matter). 
On October 7, 1988, the Clerk of this Court reviewed 
the file and mailed a certified copy of the Order of Disbarment 
addressed to Crandall at his residence at 3818 East Timberline 
Drive. This Order was received by Crandall on October 14, 1988 
and Crandall filed this appeal on October 27, 1988 (R. 75). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Findings of Fact and conclusions of law and 
Recommendation of Discipline are not supported by the evidence 
presented to the Hearing Panel 
A. Plaintiff's default was not duly entered and 
the facts of the complaints were improperly 
deemed admitted. 
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B. Plaintiff was not given notice of the hearing 
in F-300 and F-307. 
C. The Hearing Panel in reaching its 
Recommendation as evidenced by the Sanctions 
Hearing transcript improperly relied upon 
misrepresentations of Bar Counsel• 
II. From the time of Crandall's suspension for his 
alleged failure to timely tender his bar association clues until 
the filing of this Appeal, Mr. Crandall has been denied due 
process of law by the Respondent. 
A. Respondent unconstitutionally took Crandall's 
right to practice law from him. 
B. Respondent is estopped from imposing 
discipline upon Mr. Crandall after dropping 
Mr. Crandall from the roles of attorneys 
qualified to practice law in the State of 
Utah. 
C. Respondent cannot act as an independent 
tribunal after improperly taking Crandall's 
law practice from him. 
D. Plaintiff was denied due process of law in 
the F-239 and F-276 disciplinary matters and 
they should not be relied upon in reaching 
the Recommendation in these matters. 
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Mr. Crandall was denied the right to 
counsel in F-239 and F-276. 
This Court's prematurely entered Orders 
in the disciplinary matters of F-202, F-
239 and F-27 6 and thus denied Mr. 
Crandall his statutory right of review. 
(a) This Court's Order in F-276 
providing for $15,000 restitution 
from Mr. Crandall is improper where 
the Hearing Panel recommended only 
$1,500 in restitution and was 
accordingly improperly relied upon 
by the Hearing Panel in these 
matters. 
(b) The Order of Discipline in F-239 
and F-27 6 stating that two six 
month suspensions shall run 
consecutively and shall not 
commence until Crandall files a 
business plan demonstrating his 
ability to resume the practice of 
law is clearly arbitrary and 
capricious. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE 
HEARING PANEL. 
A. Plaintiff's default was not duly entered and the 
facts of the complaints were improperly deemed 
admitted. 
As set forth above, the Summons and Complaint in F-300 
was mailed by Certified Mail to Mr. Crandall at 547 West 3900 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on November 17, 1987, and was signed 
for by someone other than Mr. Crandallfs, and was not received by 
Crandall. (R. 1-5) 
The Summonses and Complaints in F-307 and F-311 were 
mailed on or about March 3, 1988, to the 547 West 3900 South 
Address. These Summonses and Complaints were returned to 
Respondent undelivered. (R. 84, 135) 
On March 31, 1988, Constable Betty Bates personally 
served the Summonses and Complaints in F-307 and F-311 upon Mr. 
Crandall. (R. 16-17) Despite the fact that the Summon's allows 
20 days to file an Answer after service of the Summons and 
Complaint, April 4, 1988, only four days after the service of the 
Summonses and Complaints in F-307 and F-311 Respondent improperly 
entered Crandall's default (R. 87). 
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As is clearly evident from Paragraph 1 of the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of Discipline of 
the Hearing Panel (R. 45-62), Respondent relies on this personal 
service as it's notice of service upon Crandall of the Complaints 
in F-307 and F-311. Respondent received the service return 
showing actual personal service upon Crandall on March 31, 1988. 
Respondent also knew that Crandall had not received the Summons 
and Complaints that were previously mailed to Crandall at the 547 
West 3900 South address because Respondent's Certified Mail was 
returned as undelivered, entered Crandall's default four days 
later, but found at the at the Discipline Hearing that the 
defaults were duly entered, that Crandall had notice of the 
Hearing, which he did not, and deemed the allegations to be 
admitted and did not take evidence as to the merits of the 
claims. Respondent next mailed the Findings and Conclusions of 
the Hearing panel to the same address it knew Crandall had not 
be receiving mail. Then Respondent waited until after the Bar 
Commission had acted on the Findings and Conclusions of the 
Hearing Panel to personally serve the Findings and Conclusions 
of the Hearing Panel on Crandall but neglected to serve the 
Commission's recommendation of discipline on Crandall even though 
it had already been entered. The record clearly shows that 
Crandall did not have a fair opportunity to respond to the 
_ 1Q _ 
allegations against him at any stage of these proceedings 
particulary at a time when he was without, employment, income 
transportation, office facilities, and was in a state of 
depression, having been previously placed out of business almost 
overnight without the Respondent affording him any hearing. 
B. Plaintiff was not given notice of the Hearing in 
F-307 and F-311. 
The record shows that Notices of Hearing which 
scheduled the Hearing held on May 17, 1987 in F-300, F-307 (the 
most serious matter) and F-311 were first mailed by certified 
mail to Crandall at the 547 West 3900 South address and were all 
returned undelivered. (R. 12-13) On May 6, 1987, Bar Counsel 
delivered only the Notice of the Hearing in F-311 to Constable 
Bates for service on Crandall. This Notice, in F-311 only, was 
personally served on Crandall at his 3818 East Timberline 
Residence on May 6, 1987. Contrary to Bar Counsel's statement 
to the Hearing Panel (R. 183), the notices of the Hearings in F-
300 and F-307 were never served on Crandall. On May 10, 1987, an 
Order of Consolidation was entered in F-311, consolidating F-300, 
F-307, and F-311 for the purposes of hearing. This Order was 
mailed on May 10, 1987, to Crandall at the 547 West 3900 South 
address and returned undelivered. (R. 24-25) Even if this mailed 
Order of Consolidation was received, which it was not, it would 
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have given Crandall only four days notice of the hearing in which 
all of the 300 Series cases were to be heard. 
Further, Bar Counsel's seemingly awkward wording of 
paragraph two of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of 
the Hearing Panel in F-300, F-307, F-311, stating that Crandall 
"was personally served with notice of hearing" but omitting any 
modifier to the word "hearing" such as "this hearing" or "the 
hearing in these matters" almost suggests an intention to mislead 
when viewed against the actual facts. In any event, Crandall was 
only served with a Notice of the Hearing in F-311. 
Second, the form of the Notice used by Respondent 
completely fails to state in any way the purpose of the Hearing. 
Sufficiency of the form of notice is an objective, not a 
subjective question. The form of the notice on in face must be 
sufficient. See, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust, Co., 
339 U.S. 300 (1950). 
II. 
FROM THE TIME OF CRANDALL'S SUSPENSION FOR ALLEGED 
FAILURE TO TIMELY TENDER HIS BAR ASSOCIATION DUES UNTIL 
THE FILING OF THIS APPEAL, MR. CRANDALL HAS BEEN DENIED 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE RESPONDENT. 
A. Conduct of Respondent is an unconstitutional taking of 
Crandall's right to practice law. 
The right and privilege to practice law is protected by 
the Constitution of the United States. The Courts have long 
recognized that those individuals seeking the privilege to 
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practice law are in a different class than those who have been 
extended the right to practice and are actively engaged in the 
practice of law. The requirements of due process differ as to 
these two classes. In Re McCune 717 P.2d 701, 709, (Utah 1986) 
and the Appendix to the Rules of the Utah Supreme listing the 
priority of hearings before this Court. 
In short, once the privilege to practice law is 
granted, that right can be taken away only by this Court, and 
then only after a full and fair hearing complying with the 
requirements of due process. Accordingly, this Court has 
delegated to the Bar Association only the power to investigate 
and make recommendations concerning discipline. It has never 
delegated the power to the Bar Association to take action "which 
affects a Lawyer's continued ability to practice law. Suspension 
or disbarment can be authorized only by the Supreme Court." In 
Re McCune, Supra, at page 709. 
In total disregarded of these principles, the Utah 
State Bar Association pursuant to Rule XX of the Procedures of 
Discipline dropped Crandall from the roll of attorneys authorized 
to practice law on May 1, 1987, for allegedly failing to timely 
tender his annual dues. After Crandall tendered his dues, 
Respondent, refused to re-enroll the Crandall and then 
repeatedly, and without explanation, delayed consideration of 
Crandall's petition for re-enrollment (Appendix II, pp. 3-4), 
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with full knowledge that Crandall was actively engaged in the 
practice of law, and that Crandall's practice and his clients 
were suffering irreparable harm. (Appendix II, Affidavit R. 
Crandall) Respondent's refusal to re-enroll Crandall was in 
direct opposition to the specific direction of Section 78-12-26, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and Rule 17, Rules of 
Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar. 
After these repeated and unexplained delays, on 
September 1, 1987, the Bar Commission finally issued its formal 
refusal to re-enroll the Crandall, simply citing the "best 
interests of the public and the Bar Association." The Bar 
Commission was apparently relying upon the provisions of Rule XX 
found in the Procedures of Discipline and continued to ignore the 
specific language found in Section 78-51-26 and Rule 17 of the 
Rules of Integration and Management of the Bar. 
Aside from any argument that Rule XX is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face, it was unconstitutionally 
applied to Crandall under the facts of this case. First, 
Respondent did not even comply with the plain language of Rule XX 
requiring the Bar Association to either order immediate re-
enrollment upon receipt of Crandall's annual dues, or within 
thirty days notify the member that the Board of Bar Commissioners 
refused his dues. Secondly, and more importantly, Rule XX was 
unconstitutionally applied to Crandall who was actively engaged 
in the practice of law and was clearly not within the 
classification for which the Rule was intended. If the Bar 
Association is concerned about disciplinary actions pending 
attorneys actively engaged in the practice of law, Rule 
VII(b)(l)/ et seq., not Rule XX of the Procedures of Discipline, 
provides for temporary suspension under appropriate 
circumstances, and contains the procedural safeguards necessary 
to protect the rights of the attorney, the interests of his 
existing clients, and the best interest of the public and Bar 
Association. 
The first time Crandall was suspended from the practice 
of law by this Court, for any reason, was nearly eight months 
after Crandall's dues suspension on May 1, 1987, when, on 
December 21, 1987, this Court adopted the Recommendation of 
Discipline of the Board of Bar Commissioners in F-202, suspending 
Crandall for six months, retroactive to May 1, 1987. The six 
month suspension in F-202 was specifically scheduled to terminate 
on November 4, 1988. By the time this Court entered the 
Suspension Order, the period of suspension had already expired. 
The basis of this recommendation was that Crandall had failed to 
file monthly status reports on his files as required by the 
initial order in F-202. All such reports were due after Crandall 
was dropped from the rolls of attorneys authorized to practice 
law on May 1, 1987. 
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At the time of the "Administrative Suspension" on May 
1, 1987, Crandall was a solo practitioner with a heavy case load 
of highly emotional and "fast track" domestic matters. Crandall 
had at the time many daily court appearances, and several trials 
per week as normally found in this type of practice. In very 
short order, after the "Administrative Suspension", Crandall's 
practice became chaotic. (Appendix, Affidavit of R. Crandall). 
By the time of the August 21, 1987 hearing in F-202 whereat 
Crandall was asked to show cause why he didn't file timely status 
reports in F-202, Crandall was completely out of business. He 
had lost all but a few clients, his office furniture had been 
repossessed, his office was closed, his secretary had quit and he 
was unemployed. 
Crandall proffers that the transcript and the files in 
F-202, F-239 and F-276 will show that despite Crandall's direct 
statement to Bar Counsel at the August 21st hearing in F-202 that 
his practice and his life were in a state of chaos, Crandall was 
subsequently met with a series of disciplinary proceedings which 
were conducted in such a manner as to give Crandall minimal or no 
notice of the proceedings. By the time the F-300, F-307 and F-
311 proceedings were commenced, Crandall was without employment, 
income, or transportation; his home was in foreclosure, he was in 
bankruptcy, and he was in a state of acute clinical depression. 
(Appendix, Affidavit of R. Crandall) 
In short, the complete "taking" of Crandall's right and 
ability to continue the practice of law was in fact accomplished 
unilaterally by the Bar Association eight months before any 
disciplinary matters were ever considered by this Court. 
B. Respondent is estopped from imposing discipline 
upon Crandall after dropping him from the roles of 
attorneys qualified to practice law in the State 
of Utah. 
As evidenced from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law of the Hearing Panel in these matters, all of the actions 
complained of occurred after Crandall was dropped from the rolls 
of attorneys authorized to practice law in the State of Utah for 
alleged failure to timely tender payment of bar dues. 
Specifically, paragraph 2 under the heading "Recommendation of 
Discipline, Aggravation," provides: 
Respondent's continuing misconduct in 
these matters took place while he was on 
administrative and/or disciplinary suspension 
form the practice of law, such conduct again 
evidencing a serious lack of regard for the 
disciplinary process. (R. 59) 
It is well established that when an attorney has been 
dropped from the rolls of those authorized to practice law, the 
Bar and this Court lose jurisdiction to impose discipline. This 
situation has most commonly been presented in cases where an 
attorney facing discipline attempts to resign his membership in 
the Bar Association, in an effort to oust the Bar and the Supreme 
Court of jurisdiction. The Courts, in considering this problem, 
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have long held that the Bar and the Court should not accept an 
attorney's resignation unless it is on conditions which are 
equivalent to the discipline which would otherwise be imposed. 
See ATTORNEYS AT LAW , 7 Am Jur 2d,& 27 p.81. 
Similarly, in the case of Louisiana State Bar Asso. v. Powell, 
195 So. 2nd 280 (LA 1976), the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
specifically held that an attorney facing discipline could not 
avoid discipline by intentionally failing to tender his dues, 
resulting in his being dropped from the roll of attorneys 
authorized to practice law, thereby ousting the Court of 
jurisdiction to impose discipline. The facts in the instant 
case, however, present the converse situation. That is, the Bar 
Association has formally refused to reinstate an attorney, 
Crandall, who was not under suspension or disbarment, after such 
attorney had tendered his dues, in direct contravention of 
Section 78-51-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Rule 
17 of the Rules for Integration and Management of the Utah State 
Bar. Then the Bar, after refusing to accept the attorney's dues 
and thereby forcing him out of business, attempts to impose 
discipline on the attorney for alleged conduct arising after the 
Bar had refused to accept the tendered bar dues and re-enroll the 
attorney as a member of the Bar. For example, in the Sieden (F-
311) and Sweeney (F-300) matters, the gravamen of both complaints 
is clearly Crandall's inability to conclude the legal matters 
after he had been placed under dues suspension. The Ashworth 
matter (F-307) involved Crandall's failure to respond to Mr. 
Ashworth's attorney as to the whereabouts of certain documents 
after Crandall's office had been involuntarily closed by a 
creditor who repossessed all Crandall's furniture, files and 
equipment. The Clay matter (F-307) involves serious allegations 
of Crandall's misappropriation of trust funds, which Crandall 
denies, and Crandall's inability to repay personal loans, all 
arising after Crandall's law practice had been closed and he was 
in financial ruin. Having wrongfully created the absolute chaos 
that resulted from refusing to re-enroll Crandall to practice law 
for eight months where Crandall was under no order of suspension 
or disbarment, the Bar Association should be estopped from 
subsequently asserting jurisdiction over Crandall. 
Further, the Utah Legislature has specifically stated 
that when an attorney has been suspended, disbarred or dropped 
from the rolls of attorneys licensed to practice law for failure 
to pay license fees, and continues to engage in the practice of 
law, the remedy is a civil proceeding as opposed to an 
administrative proceeding, with the attorney so accused having an 
absolute right to a trial by jury. See, Section 78-51-25, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
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C. Respondent cannot act as an independent tribunal 
after improperly taking Crandall's law practice 
from him. 
As set forth above, the Bar Association clearly took 
from Crandall his right to practice law without due process of 
law. Long before this Court imposed discipline upon Crandall 
(December 21, 1987), he had lost his law practice, his 
automobile, his office furniture, files and equipment, his home 
was in foreclosure, he was insolvent and soon forced to file 
personal bankruptcy. Crandall respectfully asserts that 
Respondent's improper taking of his right to practice law clearly 
placed the Bar Commissioners and Bar Counsel individually, having 
acted beyond their jurisdiction, in a position where they may be 
liable to Crandall for damages under, among other things, 42 USC 
1983, commonly known as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Further, Crandall proffers that the transcript of the 
Order to Show Cause Hearing in F-202 held on August 21, 1988, 
clearly shows that Crandall specifically placed Bar Counsel on 
notice of his claim that the Bar had wrongfully "destroyed his 
law practice". Accordingly, the Bar and its Commissioners, 
having rendered themselves liable to Crandall and having been 
placed on notice of Crandall's claim, could not act as an 
independent tribunal in these subsequent disciplinary matters. 
Therefore, Crandall was denied his right to be heard before an 
independent tribunal. 
D. Plaintiff was denied due process of law in the F-
239 and F-276 disciplinary matters and they are 
improperly relied upon in these matters, 
1. Crandall was denied the right to counsel in 
F-239 and F-276. 
On August 21, 1987, Crandall appeared together with his 
attorney, Bruce Cohne, at a hearing on a Show Cause Order in F-
202. After deliberation, the hearing panel recommended a six 
month suspension retroactive to May 1, 1987 and terminating 
November 4, 1987. At this hearing Mr. Cohne volunteered to serve 
as Crandall's probation supervisor. Although Bar Counsel had 
apparently received the original complaints in McCormick (F-276), 
Ashworth (F-307) and Sweeney (F-300), no mention of these pending 
matters was made at that hearing. (Appendix, Affidavit or R. 
Crandall) 
On September 1, 1987, despite Crandall having appeared 
at the Show Cause Hearing and Bar Counsel having made no mention 
of other disciplinary matters pending against Crandall, the Bar 
Commission, with the direct ex-parte input from Bar Counsel, 
formally refused to accept Crandall's tender of dues, thus 
permanently dropping Crandall from the rolls of attorneys 
authorized to practice law. 
Thereafter, in the month of September, 1987, the Formal 
Complaint in F-276 was sent to Crandall at 547 West 3900 South, 
and signed for by someone other than Crandall. A notice of 
hearing on F-239 was sent to Crandall on September 22, 1987, and 
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a Notice of Default was entered in F-276. None of these 
documents were sent to Crandall's attorney, Bruce Cohne. On or 
about October 4, 1987, as evidenced by the minutes of the Bar 
Commission Meeting, the Bar Commission approved the 
Recommendation of the Hearing Panel in F-202 with the requirement 
that Mr. Cohne could elect to either to continue as Crandall's 
counsel or his probation supervisor. (Appendix II p. 11) On 
October 5, 1987, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Cohne stating that the 
Board of Bar Commissioners approved the Recommendation but 
required that Mr. Cohne withdraw as counsel. Further, as 
evidenced in the letter of October 5, 1987, no mention was made 
of any pending matters against Crandall. (Appendix II P. 12). 
Pursuant to Bar Counsel's request, Mr. Cohne withdrew as counsel 
to Crandall on or about October 18, 1987. On October 23, 1987, 
Bar Counsel noticed the Disciplinary Hearings in F-276 for 
November 2, 1987. Crandall did not receive this Notice or notice 
of Mr. Cohne's withdrawal until the day before the scheduled 
hearing. As set forth in detail in Crandall's affidavit, 
Crandall telephoned Bar Counsel asking that the hearing be 
continued. At the hearings on these matters, and referring to 
events during the month of August, 1987, Bar Counsel states as 
follows: 
That brought about his suspension in F-202 and again, 
despite my request of the panel at that time that he be 
suspended for two years, they suspended him for six 
months and put him on probation again and assigned 
another probation officer to him, Mr. — wouldn't you 
know that I'd forget his name. 
MS. POLICH: Cohne. 
MS. BURDICK: Yes. Thank you. — Bruce Cohne to 
assist him in developing a business plan and presenting 
it to the Board of Bar Commissioners and again utterly 
failing to do so. Mr. Cohne withdrew. At that point 
the other two matters came up for hearing and the 
several suspensions were then ordered. (R. 190) 
It is clear that not only did Bar Counsel effectively 
deny Crandall the right to Counsel in F-239 and F-236, but Bar 
Counsel in these proceedings by misrepresentation and omission of 
material facts made it appear to the Hearing Panel that Mr. 
Cohne's withdrawal was caused by Crandall's alleged uncooperative 
attitude. Further, it should be pointed out that subsequent to 
the Hearing Panels Recommendation in F-202 that Crandall file a 
business plan demonstrating his ability to re-engage in the 
practice of law, the Bar Commission permanently refused to accept 
the tender of his dues and the Hearing Panel in F-239 and F-276 
recommended suspension totalling one year. It is respectfully 
submitted that it is arbitrary and capricious to cite Crandall 
for failure to file a business plan under F-202 when the Bar had 
no expectation of that Crandall would be resuming the practice of 
law for at least one year. 
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2. This Court's prematurely entered Orders in 
the disciplinary matters of F-202, F-239 and 
F-27 6, denied Crandall his statutory right of 
review. 
For some unexplained reason and in direct abrogation of 
the rights guaranteed Crandall by the Utah Legislature, Crandall 
was denied his right to appeal by this Court entering it's Orders 
in F-239 and F-276 on December 21, 1987, more than ten days prior 
to the expiration of the time this Court should act on a 
Recommendation of Discipline by the Bar as provided by Utah law. 
Pursuant to Section 78-51-16, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, Mr. Crandall had "the right to request a review of any 
order or recommendation of the Bar by the Supreme Court, provided 
he applies for such review within thirty days after the filing of 
such order or recommendation with the Supreme Court." This 
Court's premature entry of the Order cut short this right. This 
error was compounded by the fact that the Notices of the 
Recommendation of the Board of Bar Commissioners in F-239 and F-
276 where mailed to Crandall at the 547 West 3900 South address 
and not received and the subsequent Notice of Entry of Order of 
Discipline of this Court was in the case of F-239 mis-mailed to 
one Stanley S. Adams and in the case of F-276 was again mailed to 
the 547 West 3900 South address, at which address mail was 
routinely returned undelivered. The only Notice received by 
Crandall of either the Recommendation of the Board of Bar 
Commissioners, or this Court's Order of Discipline in F-239 and 
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F-276, was from friends who has read the publication in the Utah 
Bar Newsletter. 
3. This Court's Order in F-27 6 providing for 
$15,000 restitution from Crandall is improper 
where the Hearing Panel recommended only 
$1,500 in restitution and was accordingly 
improperly relied upon by the Hearing Panel 
in this matter. 
Paragraph 2 of the Hearing Panel's Findings in this 
matter states that Crandall should pay all restitution orders 
previously entered in F-202, F-239 and F-276. If fact, there was 
no restitution involved in F-202 or F-239. In its' 
Recommendation to this Court, the Bar Commission modified this 
language to provide specifically and particularly for restitution 
in F-239 (sic, F-276) in the amount of $15,000. The amount of 
Restitution in this matter was obviously significant to the Bar 
Commission. However, an examination of the original Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of Hearing Panel in 
F-276 discloses that the panel actually recommended that Crandall 
return a $1500 retainer (See Appendix II, p. 13), which retainer 
was largely earned by Crandall having rendered legal services. 
In the Order of Discipline of this Court in F-276, however, the 
amount of restitution was erroneously reported as $15,000. This 
error overstates the gravity of the matter by a factor of ten. 
The Order of Discipline in F-27 6, specifically and not by 
reference, erroneously orders Crandall to pay $15,000 in 
restitution (R. 42). Obviously, the Bar Commission relied upon 
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the amount of restitution previously reported in the Order of 
Discipline in F-27 6 as being significant in rendering it's 
Recommendation in F-300, F-307 and F-311. 
CONCLUSION 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in these 
matters it is absolutely clear that the Hearing Panel in making 
it's Recommendation relied on all of the six disciplinary matters 
brought against Mr. Crandall. It is also clear that all of the 
six proceedings referred to in the Recommendations were heard 
after Crandall was forced out of business by the immediate and 
wrongful suspension for failure to timely tender his Bar dues. 
This suspension lasted almost eight months before this Court ever 
entered any Order imposing discipline on Mr. Crandall. Further, 
it is clear that all of the alleged conduct complained of these 
matters arose subsequent, directly from, or was aggravated by the 
wrongful suspension of Mr. Crandall. 
These facts remove this case from the typical Bar 
discipline cases routinely before this Court. Simply stated, the 
Bar Association's errors, omissions and outright wrongful conduct 
forced Mr. Crandall out of business and inadvertently laid the 
foundation for all of the Bar complaints later filed against Mr. 
Crandall and particularly underlies the failure and in some cases 
the inability of Crandall to appear and effectively defend him-
self the Appellant respectfully submits that this matter be 
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remanded to a committee appointed by this Court to independently 
review all matters heard by the Utah State Bar Association after 
Appellant was suspended for failing to timely tender his Bar 
dues. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of June, 1989. 
NORTON, LAWRENCE & HAWKINS 
Robert G^Norton, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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APPENDIX I . 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 78-51-16 
78-51-14. Rules and regulations — Supreme Court to ap-
prove-
All rules and regulations made by the board shall be submitted to and 
approved by the Supreme Court. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 48, § 16; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 6-0-13. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 43 
Law § 29. to 45. 
Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client «=> 2. 
78-51-15. Hearings and witnesses. 
In the investigation of charges of professional misconduct, the board, and 
any committee appointed by it for the purpose, shall have the power to sum-
mon and examine witnesses under oath, and compel their attendance and the 
production of books, papers, documents and other writings necessary or mate-
rial to the inquiry. Such summons or subpoena shall be issued under the hand 
of the secretary or any member of the board, or any member of a committee 
appointed by the board to conduct such investigation or hearing, and shall 
have the force and effect of a subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 48, § 17; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 6-0-14. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Procedure and evidence. ble where relevant in a disbarment hearing. In 
Record in a prior civil proceeding is admissi- re Strong, 616 P.2d 583 (Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at tions to private professional society's judicial 
Law §§ 87 to 96. commission, ethics committee, or the like, as 
C.J.S. — 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client privileged, 9 A.L.R.4th 807. 
§§ 105 to 108, 111. Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client «=» 
A.L.R. — Testimony before or communica- 54. 
78-51-16. Rights of accused. 
Any member of the Utah State Bar complained of shall have notice of the 
charges against him and opportunity to defend by the introduction of evidence 
and the examination of witnesses called against him, the right to be repre-
sented by counsel and, upon his request, a public hearing. He shall also have 
the right to have witnesses subpoenaed to appear and testify or produce books, 
papers, documents or other writings necessary or material to his defense in 
the manner provided in the next preceding section [§ 78-51-15]. He shall have 
the right to a review of any order or recommendation by the Supreme Court; 
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78-51-17 JUDICIAL CODE 
provided, he applies for such review within thirty days after the filing of such 
order or recommendation with the Supreme Court. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 48, § 18; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 6-0-15. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Right to counsel. that the accused was forced to trial without the 
Where a hearing proceeded although counsel benefit of counsel was held without merit, 
who was to defend the accused was detained in since the action was not prejudicial. In re 
court, but testimony rested almost entirely Steffensen, 85 Utah 380, 39 P.2d 722 (1935). 
upon admissions of the accused, the contention 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at tion in disbarment or other disciplinary pro-
Law § 87 et seq. ceedings—post-Spevack cases, 30 A.L.R.4th 
C.J.S. — 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 88 243. 
et seq. Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client «=» 47 
A.L.R. — Extent and determination of attor-
 e t s eq. 
ney's right or privilege against self-incrimina-
78-51-17. Record of proceedings. 
A complete record of the proceedings and evidence taken by the board, 
committee or commissioner shall be made and preserved by the board. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 48, § 19; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 6-0-16. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at reports of judicial inquiry board or commission, 
Law § 87. 5 A.L.R.4th 730. 
C.J.S. — 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client «» 
§§ 105 to 108, 111. 54. 
A.L.R. — Confidentiality of proceedings or 
78-51-18. Findings and report. 
The board shall make findings and reports to the Supreme Court of the 
results of its hearings and investigations, and conclusions, with recommenda-
tions in the premises, and in all cases in which the evidence in the opinion of a 
majority of the board justifies such a course, shall recommend such disciplin-
ary action by public or private reprimand, suspension from the practice of the 
law, or exclusion and disbarment therefrom, as the case shall in its judgment 
warrant. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 48, § 10; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 6-0-17. 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 78-51-19 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Board required to make own findings and 
hold hearing. 
Board's adoption, without holding an eviden-
tiary hearing, of findings made by a federal 
court in a case that led to the accusations of an 
History; L. 1931, ch. 48, § 10; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 6-0-18. 
ANALYSIS 
Judicial responsibility. 
Review of charges. 
Judicial responsibility. 
The final responsibility of a disciplinary pro-
ceeding is upon the Supreme Court and this 
involves more than mere rubber stamp en-
dorsement of the action of the commission; nev-
ertheless, the Supreme Court deems it discreet 
and proper to indulge considerable latitude to 
the actions and judgment of the commission in 
such matters and would not disregard its find-
ings and recommendations in absence of some 
persuasive reasons for doing so. In re 
Macfarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631 
(1960). 
Supreme Court will follow a bar commission 
recommendation unless arbitrary, capricious 
or unreasonable. In re Wade, 27 Utah 2d 410, 
attorney's misconduct did not comply with this 
section's requirements that the board is to 
make its own findings based upon an eviden-
tiary hearing. In re Strong, 616 P.2d 583 (Utah 
1980). 
497 P.2d 22 (1972); In re Johnston, 524 P.2d 
593 (Utah 1974). 
Review of charges. 
Attorney has the right of review of the 
charges found against him and on such review 
the charges should be sustained by convincing 
proof and a fair preponderance of the evidence. 
In re McCullough, 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13 
(1939). 
On review of recommendation of suspension 
of an attoftiey by the board of commissioners of 
the Utah State Bar, the court is not limited to 
the charges and record found by the board. In 
re McCullough, 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13 
(1939). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client 
Law § 87. 54. 
C.J.S. — 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client 
§§ 34, 105 to 108, 111. 
78-51-19. Review by Supreme Court — Inherent powers of 
courts not affected. 
Upon the making of any order by the board recommending the discipline, 
suspension or disbarment of any member of the Utah State Bar from the 
practice of law, the board shall cause a certified copy thereof to be filed with 
the clerk of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may review the action of 
the board, and may on its own motion and without the certification of any 
record inquire into the merits of the case, and take any action agreeable to its 
judgment. Nothing in this title contained shall be construed as limiting or 
altering the powers of the courts to disbar or discipline members of the bar. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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78-51-25 JUDICIAL CODE 
and may be employed in a clerical position by the Utah State Bar, but shall 
not be entitled to vote at any election or upon any question. The annual 
membership fee for an inactive member shall be $5.00, payable on or before 
April 1, of each year; provided, the board of commissioners shall have power to 
increase such fee to a sum not exceeding $10.00. An inactive member may, if 
in good standing, upon his written request to the board of commissioners be 
enrolled as an active member. Upon the filing of such request and the pay-
ment of the full annual license fee for the current calendar year, less any 
membership fee paid by him as an inactive member for such year, the appli-
cant shall be immediately transferred from the inactive roll to the active roll. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 48, § 5; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 6-0-23; L. 1963, ch. 195, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Key Numbers* — Attorney and Client «=» 
Law § 7. 31, 34. 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 8. 
78-51-25, Practicing without a license prohibited — Action 
or proceedings to enforce — Exception. 
No person who is not duly admitted and licensed to practice law within this 
state nor any person whose right or license to so practice has terminated 
either by disbarment, suspension, failure to pay his license fee or otherwise, 
shall practice or assume to act or hold himself out to the public as a person 
qualified to practice or carry on the calling of a lawyer within the state. Such 
practice, or assumption to act or holding out, by any such unlicensed or dis-
barred or suspended person shall not constitute a crime, but this prohibition 
against the practice of law by any such person shall be enforced by such civil 
action or proceedings, including quo warranto, contempt or injunctive pro-
ceedings, as may be necessary and appropriate, which action or which pro-
ceedings shall be instituted by the board of commissioners of the Utah State 
Bar; providing, that in any action or proceeding to enforce the prohibition 
against the practice of law, the accused shall be entitled to a trial by jury. 
Nothing in this section shall prohibit a person who is unlicensed as an 
attorney from personally representing his own interests in a cause to which he 
is a party in his own right and not as assignee. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 112; C.L. Extraordinary writs, Rules of Civil Proce-
1917, § 323; L. 1931, ch. 48, § 21; R.S. 1933 & dure, Rule 65B. 
C. 1943, 6-0-24; L. 1963, ch. 196, § 1. Injunctions, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 65A. 
§ 78-32-1 et seq. 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 78-51-24 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 7. Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client ^ 
A.L.R. — Validity of state or municipal tax 28, 31. 
or license fee upon occupation of practicing 
law, 50 A.L.R.4th 467. 
78-51-22. Issuance of license — Form. 
The secretary of the Utah State Bar shall issue to each person paying said 
license fee, if such person shall have theretofore been admitted to practice law 
in this state by the Supreme Court and not disbarred or then under suspen-
sion, a license in such form as the board may prescribe, for the year for which 
fees were paid, and shall deliver such license to the person entitled thereto. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 48, § 13; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 6-0-21; L. 1957, ch. 175, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 7. 
Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client «=» 9, 
28. 
78-51-23. Powers of board respecting funds. 
For the purpose of carrying out the objects of this title, and in the exercise of 
the powers herein granted, the board shall have power to make orders con-
cerning the disbursement of said fund. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 48, § 14; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 6-0-22. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 7. 
Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client <s=> 
28, 31. 
78-51-24. Active and inactive members of bar. 
Any member of the Utah State Bar, who has retired from the practice of 
law, or who is not engaged in the practice of law, upon written request, may 
be enrolled as an inactive member. No member of the Utah State Bar practic-
ing law, or occupying a position in the employ of or rendering any legal 
service for an active member or occupying a position where he is called upon 
to give legal advice or counsel, or examine the law or pass upon the legal 
effect of an act, document or law, shall be enrolled as an inactive member. 
There shall be no rebate of any license fee upon transfer from active to inac-
tive membership after August 1, of the year in which the request is filed. An 
inactive member may attend the annual and special meetings, and participate 
in any debates or discussions at such meetings, may be appointed by the board 
of commissioners upon special committees, other than committees for exami-
nation of qualification for admission to practice and disciplinary committees, 
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Rules for Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar 
(A) Organization of the Utah State Bar 
1. In order to advance the administration of justice according to law, to aid the courts in carrying on the administration of justice, to provide for and regulate the admission of person: 
seeking to engage in the practice of law. to provide for the regulation and discipline of persons engaged in the practice of law, to foster and maintain on the part of those engaged in thi 
practice of law high ideals of integrity, learning, competence and public service, and high standards of conduct, to provide a forum for the discussion of subjects pertaining to the practice c 
law, the science of jurisprudence, and law reform, to carry on a continuing program of legal research in technical fields of substantive law, practice and procedure, and to make reports an< 
recommendations thereon, to encourage practices that will advance and improve the honor and dignity of the legal profession; and to the end that the responsibility of the legal professio 
and the individual members thereof may be more effectively and efficiently discharged in the public interest, and acting with the powers vested in it by the Constitution of this State and it 
inherent power over members of the legal profession as officers of the Court, the Supreme Court of Utah does hereby prepetuate, create and continue under the direction and control of thi 
Court an organization known as the Utah State Bar. All persons now or hereafter licensed in this State to engage in the practice of law shall be members of the Utah State Bar, in accordanc 
with the rules of this Court. The Utah State Bar may sue and be sued, may enter into contracts and acquire, hold, encumber, dispose of and deal in and with real personal property, an 
promote and further the aims, as set forth in these Rules. All property, real and personal and all monies of the Utah State Bar presently belonging to the Utah State Bar, shall be perpetuate 
and continued in such ownership. 
2. The qualifications of attorneys for admission to practice before the courts of this State, the duties, obligations and certain of the grounds for discipline of members, and the methc 
of establishing such grounds, subject to the right of this Court to discipline a member when it is satisfied that such member is not mentally or morally qualified to practice law even thouc 
none of the specific grounds for discipline set forth in these Rules exist, shall be prescribed in these Rules pertaining to admission and discipline! of attorneys. 
3. No person shall practice law in this State or hold himself out as one who may practice law in this State unless he is an active member of the Utah State Bar, and no suspended < 
disbarred member shall practice law in this State or hold himself out as one who may practice law in this State while suspended or disbarred. 
(B) Definitions. Unless the context otherwise requires, the following definitions shall apply to the interpretation of these Rules relating to admission and discipline of attorneys: 
1. "Board" means Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar. 
2. "Discipline" means disbarment, suspension, probation, public reprimand or private reprimand. 
3. "Member" means member of the Utah State Bar, the classifications of which are to be set forth hereinafter. 
4. "Bar" means the Utah State Bar perpetuated, created and continued by rules of this Court. 
5. "Non-Member" means a person licensed to practice law in a state, territory or possession of the United States, who is not a member of the Utah State Bar. 
6. "Supreme Court" means the Utah Supreme Court. 
(C) Rules of Organization and Management of the Bar. 
1. Qualification for Membership. All persons who have been heretofore, and all persons who shall hereafter be, duly admitted to practice as an attorney at law in the Supreme Coi 
of this State, and who are not the subject of an order of the Supreme Court which terminates, suspends or restricts the right to practice law in this State, are qualified to be members of t 
Bar, subject to the provisions of these Rules. 
2. Board of Commissioners, Number, Term and Vacancies. There shall be a Board of Commissioners of the Bar consisting of eleven members. Except as otherwise provided, t 
term of office of each commissioner shall be three years and until his successor is elected and qualified. In the event of vacancy in the Board, the remaining commissioners shall appoir 
successor from among the practicing members of the Bar of the division from which such commissioner was elected, who shall serve until the following annual election. 
3. Territorial Divisions. For the purposes of these Rules; the first judicial district shall be known as the first division; the second judicial district shall be known as the second divisi< 
the third judicial district shall be known as the third division; and the fourth judicial district shall be known as the fourth division; and the fifth, sixth and seventh judicial districts shall be kno 
as the fifth division. 
4. Number of Commissioners from each Division. There shall be one member of the Board from each of the divisions, except the third division from which there shall be se> 
commissioners. No more than one commissioner from any division, except from the third division, and no more than seven commissioners from the third division, shall serve on such Bo 
at the same time. 
5. Nomination and eligibility of Commissioners. Attorneys in one division shall alone have the right to nominate persons for the office of commissioner from that division. To 
eligible for the office of commissioner in a division, the nominee's mailing address must be in that Division as shown by the records of the Bar. Nomination to the office of commissioner s 
be by written petition of ten or more of the members of the Bar in good standing. Any number of candidates may be nominated on a single petition. Nominating petitions shall be mailed to 
secretary of the Bar within a period to be fixed by the rules made by the Board. 
6. Election of Commissioners. The Board shall be elected by the vote of the resident active members of the Bar as follows: In the year 1983 and every third year thereafter, < 
member from the second division and three members from the third division, except that in the year 1983 only, there shall be four members elected from the third division; in the year 1984 
every third year thereafter, one member from the first division and two members from the third division; in the year 1985 and every third year thereafter, two members from the third divi; 
and one each from the fourth and fifth divisions. The candidate from any division, and the three or two candidates from the third division, receiving the greatest number of votes of 
division shall be the commissioner from such division. For the year 1983, the candidate from the third division receiving the fourth greatest number of votes shall be the commissioner f 
two year term. An attorney is limited to voting for candidates for commissioner from the division in which his mailing address is located as shown by the records of the Bar. The ballots sha 
deposited in person or by mail with the secretary of the Board, or such other officer as it may designate. There shall be an annual election by the resident active members of the Bar foi 
purpose of filling vacancies. The Board shall fix the time for holding the annual election and prescribe rules and regulations in regard thereto, not in conflict with the provisions of these R' 
The Board shall, in accordance with its rules, give at (east ninety days notice by mail of the time for holding the election each year. 
Those persons holding office as commissioners at the time of the adoption of these Rules or who were elected under the existing statute will continue in office for the period of 
elected to serve. 
7. Organization of Board. After each election, the Board shall organize by the election of a president-elect and a president of the Bar. The president-elect shall be chosen from arr 
the members of the Board whose terms of office will not expire for two years or more. The president-elect for the previous year shall be elected president. The president and the presic 
elect shall hold office until their successors are elected following the next succeeding annual election. A secretary and such other assistants as the Board may require may be selected 
within or without the Board to hold office during the pleasure of the Board and to be paid such compensation as the Board shall determine. 
8. Meeting, Annual and Special - Notice. There shall be an annual meeting of the Bar, presided over by the president of the Bar, open to all members in good standing, and he 
such time and place as the Board may designate, for the discussion of the affairs of the Bar and the administration of justice. Special meetings of the Bar may be held at such times and pi 
as the Board may designate. Notice of all meetings shall be given by mail to all members of the Bar not less than fifteen days prior to the date of such meeting. 
9. By-laws. The Board shall have power to adopt by-laws, not in conflict with any of the terms of these Rules; concerning the selection and tenure of its officers and committee* 
their powers and duties, and generally for the control and regulation of the business of the Board and of the Bar. 
10. Admission to Practice Law, Qualifications, Enrollment, Oath, Fees. 
(a) The Board shall have power to determine the qualifications and requirements for admission to the practice of law, and to conduct examinations of applicants; and it shall 
time to time certify to the Supreme Court those applicants found to be qualified. Qualifications and requirements for admission to the practice of law shall be as set forth in the Revised f 
of the Utah State Bar for Admission to the Utah State Bar. The approval by the Supreme Court of any person certified for membership in accordance with such Rules shall entitle him 
enrolled in the Bar upon his taking an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and of this State and to discharge faithfully the duties of an attorney to the best of his knowl 
and ability, and the payment of the fee fixed by the Board of the Bar with the approval of the Supreme Court, and thereafter, to practice law upon payment of the license fees herein prov 
subject to the provisions of these Rules. 
(b) Upon receiving certification by the Board and approval from the Supreme Court, the applicant shall pay fifty dollars to the Clerk of the Supreme Court for a Certific 
Admission, thirty-five dollars of which shall be retained by the State Treasurer as a special fund for the benefit of the State Library, to be expended by the Board of Control. 
11. Roll of Attorneys. The Clerk of the Supreme Court must keep a roll of the attorneys admitted to practice, which must be signed by eaeh person admitted before he is enrolls 
receives his Certificate of Admission to the Bar. 
12. Conduct of Attorneys, Conduct of Judicial Officers, Complaints, Investigations, Discipline, Taking Testimony. The Board shall formulate rules governing the conduct 
persons admitted to practice, and shall investigate and consider and pass upon unethical, questionable or improper conduct of persons admitted to the practice of the law, incl 
members of the Bar holding judicial office. The Board shall also formulate rules governing procedures in cases involving alleged misconduct of members of the Bar, including those h 
judicial office, and may create committees for the purpose of investigating complaints, which committees may be empowered to administer discipline, including the recommendai 
suspension or disbarment from the practice of law, in the same manner as the Board itself, but no recommendation for the suspension or disbarment of a member shall be fin<* 
approved by the Board. The Board or any such committee may designate any officer, authorized by law to take depositions, to take testimony under oath in any such investigate 
13. Board of Commissioners, Powers, Conduct of Members of Bar Holding Judicial Office. The Board shall also have the power to make or cause to be made an investigate 
and upon all unethical, questionable, or improper conduct of members of the Bar holding judicial office and to make recommendations to the Supreme Court or other appropriate txx 
respect thereto. 
14. Rules and Regulations, Supreme Court to Approve. All rules and regulations formulated by the Board shall be submitted to and approved by the Supreme Court. 
15. Studies and Recommendations by the Bar. The Governor, the Supreme Court and the Legislature may request of the Board an investigation and study of any recommenc 
upon any matter relating to the courts of this state, practice and procedure therein, practice of the law. and the administration of justice, and thereupon it shall be the duty of said B< 
cause such investigation and study to be made, to report thereon to an annual meeting of the Bar, and, after the action of said meeting thereon, to report the same to the officer c 
making the request. The Board may, without such request, cause an investigation and study upon the same subject matters, and, after a report thereon to the annual meeting of tl 
report the same and the action of said meeting thereon to the Governor, the Supreme Court, or the Legislature. 
16. Annual License, Fees, Disbursements of Funds. Every person practicing, or holding himself out as practicing law within this state, or holding himself out to the public as a 
qualified to practice or carry on the calling of an attorney within this state shall prior to so doing and prior to the first day of March of each year, pay to the Bar a license fee in an amoui 
fixed by the Board of the Bar with the approval of the Supreme Court to effectuate the purposes of these Rules. These funds shall be administered by the Bar. 
17. Issuance of License, Form. The Secretary of the Bar shall issue to each person paying said license fee, if such person shall have theretofore been admitted to practice lav 
state by the Supreme Court and not disbarred or then under suspension, a license in such form as the Board may prescribe, for the year for which fees were paid, and shall deliv 
license to the person entitled thereto. 
18. Powers of the Board Respecting Funds. For the purpose of carrying out the objects of these Rules, and in the exercise of the powers herein granted, the Board shall hav« 
to make orders concerning the disbursement of said funds. 
19. Active and Inactive Members of the Bar. Any member of the Bar, who has retired from the practice of law, or who is not engaged in the practice of law, upon written requc 
- . »._„ K« „« raHata nf anv license fee upon transfer from active to inactive membership after August 1, of the year in which the request is I 
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(3) The disciplinary proceeding is based upon allegations that have 
become generally known to the public, 
(b) A complainant shall have the right to appear before the disciplinary 
panel personally or through a designated representative to make a statement 
in support of his or her complaint or in opposition to the matters presented by 
the attorney against whom complaint has been made. This shall not include 
direct confrontation of the parties unless specifically authorized by the panel 
Rule VII. Discipline and Sanctions. 
(a) Disbarment. Disbarment shall result in the revocation of an attorney*! 
license to practice law and in the removal of the disbarred attorney from tag 
roll of attorneys of the Supreme Court authorized to engage in the practice o | 
law in the state of Utah. The Supreme Court has exclusive power to ordefl 
disbarment. 
(b) Suspension. Suspension of an attorney shall remove said individualasj 
a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court in good standing and shall render| 
him or her incapable and unqualified to practice law in the state of UtaH 
during the period of suspension. The period of suspension may be of any timef 
frame less than 2 years' duration. The Supreme Court has exclusive powers tol 
order suspension. Any term of suspension may be stayed by the Supreme! 
Court conditioned on the suspended attorney's compliance with certain terns] 
and conditions of the stayed suspension. An active member of the Utah State] 
Bar who is in good standing may be appointed by the Board to supervise tH*| 
suspended attorney and to assure that the suspended attorney complies witfil 
the terms and conditions of the stayed suspension. 
(1) Temporary suspension. Upon petition of the Board, or of the Com-! 
mittee (with the consent of the Board) filed with the Supreme Court, or rin] 
its own motion, the Supreme Court may issue an interim order suspend^ 
ing an attorney from the practice of law or imposing temporary conditions] 
of probation pending a final determination in any disciplinary proceedj 
ing. The Supreme Court shall have exclusive power to place an attorney^ 
on interim suspension. If such a petition of the Board is filed prior to | 
concurrently with or subsequent to the filing of its findings, conclusions' 
and recommendation with the Supreme Court in a disciplinary case, such; 
petition shall be supported by affidavits and exhibits demonstrating thaitj 
the attorney has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or is 
causing great harm to the public and/or a client or clients pending final 
disposition of the disciplinary proceeding. 
(2) In the event of a petition for interim suspension, the Board shall 
have the burden of proof that the relief sought should be granted in whole 
or in part. 
(3) Any order of temporary suspension shall preclude the attorney from 
accepting new cases, but shall not preclude him from continuing to repre-
sent existing clients during the first 30 days after the effective date of the 
temporary order, provided that any fees tendered to such attorney for 
services performed during the 30-day period shall be deposited in a trust 
fund from which withdrawals may be made only in accordance with re-
strictions imposed by the Supreme Court. 
(4) A temporary suspension order which restricts the attorney from 
maintaining an account against which the attorney may make with-
drawals shall serve as an injunction to prevent the bank from making 
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further payments thereon except in accordance with restrictions imposed 
by the Supreme Court. 
(5) The Supreme Court shall have exclusive power to terminate an 
interim suspension. 
(c) Probation. Probation may be imposed only in those cases in which 
there is little likelihood that the attorney on probation will harm the public 
during the period of probation and the conditions of probation can be ade-
quately supervised. The Board may appoint an active member of the Utah 
State Bar who is in good standing to supervise the attorney and to assure that 
the attorney fulfills the conditions of the probation. 
Probation shall be imposed for a specified period not in excess of 2 years and 
may be renewed for an additional 2-year period. The conditions of the proba-
tion shall be stipulated in writing and may only be imposed by the Supreme 
Court. 
Probation may be terminated upon the filing of an affidavit by the respon-
dent that he has complied with the conditions of probation and an affidavit by 
the probation supervisor that probation is no longer necessary. 
If the probation supervisor fails to file an affidavit, Bar Counsel should 
investigate to determine whether the respondent should be fully reinstated. 
Bar Counsel may recommend that the respondent be fully reinstated, that the 
period of probation be extended for a period not to exceed 2 years or that other 
discipline be imposed. 
(d) Public reprimand. For unprofessional conduct, an attorney may be 
publicly reprimanded. The Supreme Court has exclusive power to impose the 
reprimand. Such shall be accomplished in writing with the reasons for the 
same set forth with particularity. A public reprimand, while a form of serious 
professional discipline, shall not impair the privilege of the attorney to con-
tinue the practice of law in the state of Utah. A permanent record shall be 
maintained of the reprimand so that it is available in determining the extent 
of discipline to be imposed in the event other complaints of unprofessional 
conduct are subsequently prosecuted against the attorney. 
(e) Private reprimand. For unprofessional conduct of a lesser character, a 
private reprimand may be imposed upon an attorney. The Board has power to 
impose a private reprimand. Said reprimand shall be in writing and shall set 
forth the facts constituting the unprofessional conduct. If the Committee rec-
ommends a private reprimand to the Board, such recommendation shall be in 
writing including a statement of the nature of the case, defenses and the 
factual basis for the recommendation. A confidential record of the private 
reprimand shall be permanently maintained so that it may be available in 
determining the extent of discipline to be imposed in the event that other 
complaints of unprofessional conduct are subsequently prosecuted against the 
attorney. Notice of the reprimand shall be given to the complainant. 
(f) Private admonition. For unprofessional conduct of a minor character 
or to provide a guide for future conduct of the attorney, a private admonition 
may be issued. Such admonition shall be issued only by the Committee after a 
hearing in which the attorney has had an opportunity to present his position 
or defense. A private admonition may be considered by Bar Counsel or the 
Committee in determining whether there is indicated an established course of 
unprofessional conduct, but such reference shall not relate to admonitions 
issued 5 years or more previously. 
(g) Costs. For unprofessional conduct, the Supreme Court and/or the Board 
may require payment of the disciplined attorney of costs of the proceedings, 
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having the opportunity to be present. The attorney shall have the burned of 
proof of showing that the Committee recommendation is unreasonable, unsup-
ported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious or otherwise clearly erro-
neous. 
(b) In the event that the Board issues a private reprimand against the 
attorney in question, confidential notice shall be given to the complainant, 
stating that his complaint has been substantiated and that the attorney in 
question has been privately reprimanded. The attorney will also be notified 
that the private reprimand, as issued, will be maintained in the files of the 
Bar as a permanent record for future reference. 
(c) The Board may remand the Committee's recomr lendation :: f a j: i i i .te 
reprimand to the Committee for reconsideration. 
Rule XI, Proceedings on Konn iiiiiiill "I!"" IHIIIIIIIUM1 "I 'o iupla int . 
(a) Formal Committee Complaint. In the event the Committee deter-
mines that a Formal Committee Complaint is merited, it shall prepare and 
file with the Board said Formal Committee Complaint setting forth in plain 
and concise language the facts upon which the charge of unprofessional con-
duct is based and the specific applicable provisions of the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct. The Formal Committee Complaint shall be signed by 
the Committee Chairman or, in his absence, by any other Committee member. 
Bar Counsel shall advise the complainant that a Formal Committee Com-
plaint, involving formal charges, has been filed against the attorney in ques-
tion. 
(b) Service. Bar Counsel shall cause to be served upon the attorney in 
question a copy of the Formal Committee Complaint and a summons, the 
latter of which shall require the attorney to appear and answer said Formal 
Committee Complaint within 20 days after service. Service shall be made 
personally upon the attorney in question or by registered or certified mail to 
the last known address as shown by the official roster of attorneys of the Bar. 
Three additional days shall be allowed to answer the Formal Committee Com-
plaint in the event that service is accomplished by mail. Proof of service of the 
summons and the Formal Committee Complaint shall be made by affidavit of 
the person making such service or by a certificate of mailing by registered or 
certified mail or by the affidavit of Bar Counsel that such mailing has been 
accomplished. 
(c) Answer. The attorney in question shall file his answer to the Formal 
Committee Complaint in writing with the office of the Executive Director of 
the Bar within the time allowed or such further time as the Board, upon good 
cause shown, may grant. The answer shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the Formal Committee Complaint and may raise such defenses and motions 
as are permitted under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of the 
answer shall be served upon Bar Counsel who may thereafter file a reply as to 
new matters raised by the answer. The Board shall proceed to hear the case on 
the issues framed by the pleading and motions, if any, and notice shall be 
given to Bar Counsel and the attorney of the time and place for such hearing. 
(d) Default. In the event the attorney fails to file and serve his answer to 
the Formal Committee Complaint within the time established, he shall be 
deemed to have admitted the allegations and charges in the said Complaint 
and the Board shall enter the attorney's default. The Board shall thereupon 
fix a time and place for hearing, notice of which shall be given to Bar Counsel 
and the attorney, and shall thereupon proceed to hear and receive evidence 
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and argument with respect to the discipline, if any, to be imposed or recom-
mended. 
(e) Discovery. For a period not to exceed 75 days from service of the Por^ g 
mal Committee Complaint, Bar Counsel and the attorney may engage Hi?! 
discovery proceedings pursuant to Rules 26 through 37, Utah Rules of Civili 
Procedure. For good cause shown, the Board may extend the time for discftvSJ 
ery, not to exceed an additional 120 days, unless there are extraordinary] 
circumstances requiring a further delay. 
(0 Orders compelling discovery and sanctions. Either Bar Counsel 
the attorney in question may move the Board for an order compelling discos 
ery, giving reasonable notice of the motion to the opposing party. Thereaf£i| 
if Bar Counsel or the attorney in question fails to comply with the BoayJlf_ 
order, the Board may make such orders in regard to the failure as are ju!$l 
and, among others, the following: 
(1) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made'lorI 
any other designated facts be taken to be established for the purposes'^ 
the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the orderj| 
(2) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or t>|fjj 
pose designated claims or defenses or prohibiting him from introduces 
designated matters into evidence; 
(3) An order striking pleadings or parts thereof or staying fiirther prog 
ceedings until the order is obeyed or dismissing the proceedings or fcngl 
part thereof or entering findings, conclusions and recommendations! 
against the disobedient party by default. 
(g) Pretrial procedure. The Board or a designated hearing committee! 
may, in its discretion, sua sponte or upon motion of Bar Counsel or the attbr|| 
ney in question, direct that a pretrial conference be held to consider matters! 
and issues pursuant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon sucnl 
conference, the Board shall issue an order reciting the action taken at*thej 
conference, amendments allowed to the pleadings and stipulations madei 
which limit the issues for trial. Such order shall control the subsequent course! 
of the case, unless modified at the hearing to prevent manifest injustice^ 
(h) Filing. The originals of all pleadings, motions, orders, etc., shall be filed] 
with the Executive Director of the Bar, who shall function as clerk in alii 
disciplinary Formal Committee Complaint proceedings. Copies of all suchl 
documents shall be mailed or delivered to the attorney or his counsel and allj 
members of the designated hearing committee. 
Rule XII. Disciplinary Hearing before Board. 
(a) Hearing Committee Panel. All Formal Committee Complaints wilLbe 
submitted to and heard before a committee of two members of the Bar selected 
by the Board and one public member appointed by the Supreme Court. The 
Board shall appoint twelve members of the Bar to act on the Hearing Commit-4 
tee Panel, consisting of two attorneys from the first and second divisions, two 
attorneys from the fourth and fifth divisions, six attorneys from the third 
division and two at-large attorneys from any divisions. In addition, six public 
members of the Hearing Committee Panel shall be appointed by the Supreme 
Court. All regular terms shall be three years, and no member shall serve more 
than two consecutive three-year terms. Provided, however, for the initial ap-
pointments to the Hearing Committee Panel, one member of the Bar from the 
first and second divisions shall be appointed for one year, and one shall be 
appointed for three years; one member of the Bar from the fourth and fifth 
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divisions shall be appointed for two years and one for three years; two mem-
bers of the Bar from the third division shall be appointed for one year, two 
shall be appointed for two years and two shall be appointed for three years 
and the public members shall be appointed one for one year, two for two years 
and two for three years. The President of the Bar shall assign a hearing 
committee to a particular case and shall name a hearing committee chairman 
from the Committee in each case 
(b) Evidence, The rules of evidence and procedure applicable to the con-
duct of nonjury civil trials in the district courts of the state of Utah shall 
govern the hearing on a Formal Committee Complaint. A verbatim recording 
shall be maintained by electronic and/or stenographic means. 
(c) Burden and standard of proof. The burden of proof shall be on Bar 
Counsel to sustain the Formal Committee Complaint, or various counts 
thereof, by clear and convincing evidence. 
(d) Personal attendance by the attorney. Unless excused from atten-
dance by the chairman of the Hearing Committee for good cause shown, the 
attorney whose conduct is the subject of the hearing shall attend the hearing 
in person and shall answer any questions put to him by Bar Counsel and the 
Hearing Committee. 
(e) Findings, conclusions and recommendation. After the hearing is 
completed, the Hearing Committee shall make written findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and its recommendation as to the discipline of the attorney and 
shall submit the same to the Board. The Board shall review and consider the 
findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Hearing Committee, and it 
may affirm, modify or disaffirm the Hearing Committee determinations in 
whole or in part. The findings, conclusions and recommendation shall then be 
entered by the Board either dismissing the complaint or recommending dis-
barment, suspension, probation, public reprimand, restitution and/or costs. A 
copy of the findings, conclusions and recommendation shall be served upon 
Bar Counsel and the attorney in question or his counsel. 
(f) Petitions for amendment, modification or reconsideration. With 10 
days of service of the Board's findings, conclusions and recommendation, Bar 
Counsel or the attorney in question may petition the Board to amend, modify 
or reconsider the findings, conclusions or recommendation. The petition shall 
be filed with the Executive Director of the Bar. The petition shall specify any 
proposed amendment or modification and any reasons advanced for reconsid-
eration. The petition may be supported by legal argument and may be accom-
panied by a request for oral argument. The Board shall permit oral argument 
on the petition if requested. 
(g) Transmittal to Supreme Court. Upon all proceedings before the 
Board having been concluded, in the event that discipline is recommended, a 
certified copy of the Board recommendation setting forth the recommended 
discipline, accompanied by the findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall be 
forthwith forwarded to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, and copies thereof 
shall be served upon the attorney in question and Bar Counsel. 
(h) Public access to proceedings. Upon the filing of a Formal Committee 
Complaint, the pleadings in the matter shall be open to the view of all inter-
ested persons. Evidentiary hearings conducted by the Hearing Committee 
shall be open to the public. The findings of fact, conclusions of law and recom-
mendation of the Hearing Committee and Board shall be open to all interested 
persons. 
(i) Ex parte communications prohibited. Neither Bar Counsel nor mem-
bers of the disciplinary staff shall engage in ex parte communications with 
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members of the Board or members of the Hearing Committee concerning any^ 
disciplinary case that is being or may be considered by the Board of thef* 
Hearing Committee. 
Rule XIII. Discipline by Consent. 
At any time during a disciplinary proceeding, the Board may at its < 
tion accept from the attorney in question an admission to the accusation 
contained in the complaint or the Formal Committee Complaint in excl 
for a stated form of discipline. Such written admission shall specify that} 
attorney in question agrees that the Formal Committee Complaint cannot^ 
successfully resisted, that the attorney has violated provisions of the Re\ 
Rules of Professional Conduct as charged, that the admission is made volt 
tarily and without coercion or duress and that the attorney in question 
aware of the implications of the admission and the misconduct, the n a t u r e ^ 
which shall be specifically set forth. 
The admission may be accepted upon such terms and conditions as ; th | 
Board shall prescribe subject to review and approval of the Supreme Cou 
Rule XIV. Review by and Appeals to the Supreme Coi 
(a) Review on appeal. Within 30 days after service of findings, conch] 
sions and a recommendation of the Board upon the attorney in question aruj 
Bar Counsel, the attorney or Bar Counsel (the latter acting at the express! 
direction of the Committee) may seek review by the Supreme Court by filing aj 
written notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. Said notice] 
shall set forth the basis of the appeal, specifying grounds for the appeaLfA.1 
copy of the notice of appeal shall be served on the other party and upon thel 
Executive Director of the Bar on behalf of the Board. 
(1) The Executive Director shall be responsible for preparing the recordj 
of the proceedings and forwarding the same to the Supreme Court, whictf 
shall be accomplished within 60 days following the notice of appeal. The 
record shall include the original complaint, Formal Committee Com-
plaint, pleadings, notices, motions and other papers filed in the case. The 
appellant shall be responsible for paying the costs of a transcript of the 
Board proceedings to be filed with the Supreme Court at the time that the 
record is filed. On the filing of the record and the transcript, the Supreme 
Court shall set a briefing schedule for the appellant and the respondent. 
Any briefs filed with the Supreme Court shall conform to and be in accor-
dance with Rule 75 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon the filing of 
briefs, the Supreme Court shall set a date for oral argument. 
(2) Upon submission of the case, the Supreme Court shall issue a writ-
ten opinion as in other appellate matters before it, in which the findings, 
conclusions and recommendation of the Board may be approved, modified 
or reversed. 
(b) Proceedings if no appeal. If there is no appeal from the findings, 
conclusions and recommendation of the Board, the Supreme Court shall enter 
an order approving and adopting the same as its own, unless from a review of 
the findings and conclusions, it is determined that the recommendation is 
arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous. 
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(d) Compliance with the provisions of Paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule shall 
be an absolute precondition for reinstatement or readmission to the Bar. The 
failure to comply with Paragraph (a) or (c) shall constitute a contempt of the 
Supreme Court and may be punished by confinement, fine, payment of costs or 
further disciplinary action. 
Rule XIX. Suspension for Disability. 
(a) Committee determination. When in the course of disciplinary proceed-
ing or otherwise the Committee determines that an attorney, because of men-
tal infirmity, mental illness or addiction to intoxicants or drugs, poses a dan-
ger to the interest of his clients and the general public and should not be 
permitted to practice law further, the Committee may: 
(1) Refer the matter to the Board upon recommendation that the Board 
may accept the voluntary surrender of the attorney's license to practice 
law; 
(2) File a Formal Committee Complaint for the medical suspension of 
the attorney's license to practice law, which Formal Committee Com-
plaint shall be treated and heard as other such complaints pursuant to 
these rules with the exception that there shall be substituted in the For-
mal Committee Complaint in place of allegations of unprofessional con-
duct a plain and concise statement of the mental infirmity, mental ill-
ness, or addiction to intoxicants or drugs set forth. 
Ob) Board recommendation. Upon determination by the Board that an 
attorney is suffering from mental infirmity, mental illness or addiction to 
intoxicants or drugs so as to render him substantially disabled and unable to 
continue the practice of law, the Board shall enter findings, conclusions and 
an order pursuant to Rule XII of these rules and shall recommend suspension 
of the attorney for medical reasons until such attorney is restored to health 
and/or rehabilitated and a good and sufficient showing thereof is made before 
the Board. 
(c) Review by Supreme Court, The Supreme Court shall review the rec-
ommendation of suspension for medical disability as in other disciplinary 
proceedings pursuant to these rules 
Rule XX. License Fee — Suspension for Nonpayment 
The annual license fee shall be payable on or before March 1 of each year. 
Any member, active or inactive, who fails to pay the fees upon that date or 
within 30 days thereafter shall be dropped from the roll of qualified attorneys. 
In such event, he shall not practice law or appear as an attorney in any court 
of this state until he is reinstated. The Executive Director of the Bar shall 
give notice of such removal from the rolls to such noncomplying member by 
certified mail and by ordinary mail to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
and to the judges of the district and circuit courts of the state. The noncomply-
ing member may apply in writing for re-enrollment by tendering the delin-
quent fees and a $100.00 filing fee, as approved by the Supreme Court. Upon 
receiving the same, the Utah State Bar Commission shall accept it and order 
re-enrollment, unless the Board for some justifiable cause deems it not to be in 
the best interests of the Bar and the public to do so. In that event, the Board 
shall within 30 days so notify the member. He may then within 30 days after 
receipt of such notice petition the Board for a hearing before it or a committee 
appointed by it for that purpose. Such a hearing shall be held without undue 
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delay, and the member shall be given at least 10 days' notice of the time and 
place of such hearing. Upon his request, he shall be informed in writing of the 
reasons for such refusal. He shall be afforded the privileges of appearing 
personally and/or by counsel at the hearing, of cross-examining any witness 
against him and of offering evidence in his own behalf. Pursuant to tha| 
proceeding, the Board shall make written findings and such order as in itsjj 
judgment will best serve the interests of the Bar and of the public. Sudd 
findings and order shall be served on the member by certified mail witWn*jti| 
days thereafter. Such proceedings and the order made are subject to reviewjby] 
the Supreme Court upon application made within 30 days after the date of t ta 
entry of the order. 
Rule XXI. Readmission and Reinstatement. 
(a) Readmission. An attorney who has been disbarred shall not be entitled] 
to apply for readmission to the Bar until at least 5 years after the effective 
date of disbarment. In all events, said individual shall not be considered for] 
readmission unless there is shown, by clear and convincing evidence to the! 
Board and the Supreme Court, rehabilitation of that conduct which broughl 
about the disbarment, as well as fitness to practice law, competence and com! 
pliance with all applicable disciplinary orders and rules. A disbarred attorney,* 
seeking readmission to the Bar shall be required, in addition, to successfully] 
sit for and pass the regular State Bar examination. The Supreme Court has 
exclusive power to readmit a disbarred attorney. 
(b) Reinstatement. An attorney who has been suspended from the practice" 
of law for unprofessional conduct shall not be entitled to apply for reinstate-
ment until the time for suspension has passed and there is shown by clear and 
convincing evidence that all terms and conditions of the suspension have been 
met, all applicable disciplinary orders and rules have been satisfied and the 
suspended attorney is fit and competent to re-engage in the practice of law^ 
An attorney who has been suspended for a period of one year or more shall be 
required to successfully pass a special written examination on legal ethics; 
The Supreme Court has exclusive power to reinstate a suspended attorney,-
(c) Proceedings. An application for readmission or reinstatement shall be 
by written and verified petition, addressed to the Board and filed with the' 
Executive Director of the Bar. The petition shall set forth the name, age and 
business and residential addresses of the petitioner, his residence and occupa-
tion during the period of disbarment or suspension, the cause of disbarment or 
suspension and a concise statement of facts upon which it is claimed that 
readmission or reinstatement is justified. The petition must be accompanied 
by a filing fee of $200.00. 
(d) Hearing on petition. The Board shall fix a time and place for the 
hearing of the Petition and shall give notice thereof to Bar Counsel and the 
Committee. Prior to the date of hearing on the petition, the Committee, Bar 
Counsel or any other person may file with the Board a typewritten or printed 
statement supporting or opposing the petition. The Board shall also cause an 
investigation to be made of the moral character and conduct of the petitioner 
during the period of disbarment or suspension. If the petition is one of rein-
statement and the investigation discloses facts upon which a complaint for 
unprofessional conduct may be predicted, the Board shall refer the case to the 
Committee for filing of a Formal Committee Complaint in accordance with 
these rules. 
APPENDIX I I . 
ROBERT G. NORTON (USB #5118) 
Attorney for Appellant 
275 East 2nd South, Suite TJU 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 359-8400 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD K. CRANDALL 
I 
| Case No. 880325 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY Ul IJUiT LAK1', ) 
I, Richard I , <LJ aiiaa 1 J ne i ,q n . , . vr in , , -.« ,ir 
depose and say as follows: 
1. :»el ] an I: in the above entitled matter 
and have personal knowledge of facts stated herein. 
2. The conversations related in herein are as close 
••pnken «•('". pM'. i b 1 e and are without 
embellishment Further, these conversations as stated are based 
upon a <:1 eai recollection in thai the conversations and events 
woi e s I gn :i f J CIJJJ I I • "" l ' ' p " 
3 . in May oJ IIHU, l war: engaged tne p r a c t i c e of 
law wi th o f f i c e s at. ISC) South 4(hi E a s t , S a l t Lake Ci ty . ; t . v I 
ma. I i i i I 11 a ( i i i i in HI i / 1 i in In i '' y 
practice and particularly in May af I > ^rimari^y 
consisted GJL divorce cases. in April and May * - * 
In Re: ' | 
RIC •• ^RANDALL, | 
somewhere between 70 to 90 open active matters. Due to the 
nature of domestic practice, different files would be opened and 
closed daily. There would be daily court appearances, including 
orders to show cause for temporary restraining orders, and weekly 
trials. The clients were for the most part emotional, demanding 
and generally hard to please. Collection of fees was a constant 
problem. 
4. On May 5, 1987 I was administratively suspended from 
the practice of law. On or around this date I called the Bar 
Office on at least two occasions and told them that it was ray 
understanding that my bookkeeper had made the payment and would 
get it straightened out. The individual I spoke with at the Bar 
said they would double check their records. One of the 
conversations was with Stephen Hutchinson, the other individuals 
were unknown to me. Sometime thereafter, I either called back or 
someone called me and confirmed that the Bar showed no record of 
receiving the dues. I told the individual at the Bar, that I 
would immediately hand carry the dues together with the $100.00 
fine to the Bar Office. I was told it was too late for them to 
accept the dues without the Executive Committee's approval, and 
that I would have to submit a written request for acceptance. I 
was told when the next Executive Committee meeting would be held, 
and told to submit my dues and a written request prior to that 
meeting. Inasmuch as the meeting was several weeks away, I asked 
if the request could be submitted to the members of the Executive 
Committee for individual approval because of the urgency. I was 
foi J in I " ubmitted — * h;n manner• I was told 
this was a matter of procedure and tha 
1 !s t !:: h i is point
 f !! asked to speak to Bar Counsel and was either 
transferred Counsel, Carol 
Nesset-Sale. At this time, stated riesset-Salt I I ul I lie 
Administrative Suspension for failure _ i_v dues was causing 
serious problems hurting both me and ray 
clients. Sar Counse response was that the Executive unmii n. 
eview the matter, asked the Bar Counsel i I 
could appear and ::.*.
 r.*.^  . matters. stated 
Counsel thci - practitioner specializing 
cases. That have daily court 
appearances including severaJ tiiuit : id appearances n 
orders t/v \»•-*• ^ involving restraining orders, and that I had 
no associv then reviewed detail my 
actual calendei - several weeks 
. Lntic was * omeway l ould partially be relieved from the 
suspension to hand.: «, i^iiMy pressing matters until 
the next meeting n^ executive Committee. Bar 
tiiere WW. iici authorit- Limited Appearances and added that 1 
shou id not q i vi w\.\ i i i n<• i• i w 11 h rlients, or bill 
time in l.he capacity «nl «n attorney, - ill 
on I rn hf an attorney i asked Bar Counsel what I should tell my 
angry clients. H . H 111 « i i §»q j>onded that shouId have 
submitted my dues on time fiii'i it was my own taui '"j i )ur In :e 
w "• "i"1 | 'i »" could do. in response t ««" her statement tnat I 
should have submitted my dues on time, I stated that up until 
1985 I had been with a firm whose office manager handled the 
submission of dues and that I had instructed ray bookkeeper to pay 
the due prior going on vacation for two weeks and had, in any 
event, he tendered my dues this year on a date earlier that he 
did last year. Bar Counsel then cited the rule authorizing 
suspension for failure to pay dues and stated the only advice she 
could give me was to Mgo on vacation again*M On or sibout July 9, 
1987, I received a letter from Julie Smiley at the Bar 
Association referring the matter from the Executive Committee to 
the Board of Bar Commissioner's meeting on July 31, 1987 (See 
Exhibit 1). On August 5, 1987, I received the attached letter 
(See Exhibit 2) deferring the matter until the Board of Bar 
Commissioner's meeting on August 28, 1987. 
4. Sometime in June my Secretary called in sick and 
never returned to work. On August 15, 1988 while I was in court 
helping another Attorney handle one of ray former cases, my 
furniture and equipment was taken by a creditor without warning. 
On August 21, 1987 I appeared before the hearing panel in F-202, 
together with my Attorney, Bruce Cohne, on an Order to Show Cause 
why my probation in F-202 should not be revoked because I failed 
to file monthly reports. Appearing as Associate Bar Counsel was 
Christine Burdick. At this hearing I became emotional and 
tearfully stated to the panel and to Ms. Burdick, that my life 
was in a state of chaos, that the dues suspension had ruined my 
practice and that I was so overwhelmed by the effects of the dues 
suspension that terally didn ' * ability to 
sunima counsel. j. also 
told panel left. I presented a 
summary of these files. stated directly Christine Burdick, 
Associate Bai - < » n i§i. i • I , delayed 
consideration of tendering of dues and that this was In 
violation J. U U C oa. Association's own Rules. panel 
recommended suspension retro active ' > "f 
the dues suspension - My counsel/ Mi i ohne, 
111 iiniit pfM r<1 supervise : robation in F-202. Hai Counsel 
approvec - v:- Cohne withoi comment tiei , ml M is IIPIII i iig 
^
r
 Counse lentioned nothing about there being any 
: -v -ratters. 
6. Sometime ; r October, Mr withdrew y 
Attorney at the request o» ; Counsel, claiming that Mr. Cohne 
notential not actual 
conflict of interest position. Shortly thereafter, Bar Counsel 
scheduled hearing J screening panels in F-239, F-276 on Nov. 
2 t1 mi i inn j i i"l Il 11 i h e " ' • " • I 
called "ounsel Christine Burdick and Inquired as ;.** 
nature * - - taring, She told me that it. was the hearing panel 
joramenu stated 
that si * **as qoiro 10 request: ,* * suspensic . V.J, tai;„ ^atter. 
.ssociate Bar Counsel Burdick that 
just receive 
been asked by Bar Counsel withdraw ir.y ounsel < 
PAGE '5 - AFt'lDJWI I Ull I . UIAkl) II1 i HkUDh ,1 
asked her to continue the matter for even a few days to allow me 
time to get a new lawyer and prepare for the hearing. She 
refused, stating that she would not continue the hearing since 
the screening panel had been notified and she had some difficulty 
finding a date when they all could appear anyway and that she 
wouldn't change the date. I stated that I would call all the 
members of panel myself and get a new date as quickly as possible 
and stated to Bar Counsel that given the proposed recommendation, 
I felt my request was not unreasonable. Bar Counsel responded 
that she had just sent me a letter giving me notice of an 
informal complaint she had received from John Clay, and that she 
was going to seek disbarment on that matter. I then asked Bar 
Counsel to at least present ray request for a continuance because 
I could not appear. The conversation was terminated. This is 
the only conversation I have ever had with Bar Counsel, other 
than my prior conversation with Ms. Nessett-Sale as set forth 
above. 
Finally, I cannot over emphasize the impact the 
"Administrative Suspension" had on my practice and my personal 
life. This was particularly aggravated by the repeated delays in 
deferring consideration of my request for re-enrollment, first to 
the Executive Committee meeting, then to the Board meeting at the 
end of July, then finally to the Board meeting at the end of 
August, all totally, without explanation of any kind. This 
created a situation where I continued to defer those matters that 
could be continued or deferred until after the time I expected to 
be re-enrolled, only to find re-enrollment had been again 
deferred. This was an impossible situation causing matters to be 
carried forward repeatedly. These delays caused complete loss of 
creditability with clients, the courts, other attorneys, and my 
creditors who were typically paid from ray now non-existent cash 
flow. In short, nobody would believe that the Bar would require 
me to remain so long on Administrative suspension for failure to 
pay dues. 
In short, if I had known in May of 1987 that my request for 
re-enrollment would not be considered until the end of August, I 
would have immediately withdrawn from all my files, closed my 
office, let my secretary go, and tried to find another job. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
* s s 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Before me this day personally appeared RICHARD K. CRANDALL, 
who, being first duly sworn, deposed and said that he is the 
person who executed the foregoing AFFIDAVIT, and that the facts 
herein stated are true. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23rd day of February, 
1989. **N -.BY "•/•'<:', 
= S S I I L L : ; ^ ^ , , I rUTfl III. .QIQA/Y\UA 
| ^^ .-i-.^ .TExpires 5 NOTARY PUBLIC FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
%<p,^-'-'/H. '3v2 ' x ^  My commission expires <SixVU 9^ ^ 3 
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Utah §tateBar 
425 East First South • Salt Lake City Utah 84111 
Telephone- (801) 531-9077 • (WATS) 1-800-662-9054 
July 8, 1987 
Mr. Richard K. Crandall 
350 South 400 East, #114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Mr. Crandall: 
As we discussed during our conversation of last week, 
I submitted your petition to the Executive Committee of the 
Board of Commissioners to the Utah State Bar requesting 
that you be reinstated after suspension of non-payment of 
license fees. The Executive Committee felt it would be 
necessary to discuss the matter with the full Commission. 
Their next full meeting is scheduled for July 31, 1987. 
As I explained previously, their is no conditional 
license or Rule that allows you to practice until this 
matter has been resolved. Therefore, please be av/are that 
under our Rules you are not eligible to practice law in the 
State of Utah. 
If you have questions, please feel free to contact our 
office. 
Sincerely, 
<SIhxJ. S^J 
/ i u l e e G. S m i l l e y ^ - ^ 
^ A d m i s s i o n s A d m i n i s t r a t o r 
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Utah §tateBar 
425 East First South • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-9077 • (WATS) 1-800-662-9054 
August 4, 1987 
Mr. Richard K. Crandall 
350 South 400 East, #114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Dear Mr. Crandall: 
Your petition for reinstatement to the bar was 
presented to the Board of Conunissioners at their meeting on 
July 31, 1987. I regret to advise ydtPthat they have 
deferred action on your petition ancKjnayJkddress the issue 
at the next scheduled meeting on August 28, 1987. 
I need to reiterate that you should not practice law 
in Utah until that reinstatement is complete. There is no 
conditional license that would allow you to practice until 
this matter is settled. 
If you have questions, please feel free to contact our 
office. 
Sincerely, 
lee G. Smilley ^ 
i s s ions Administrator 
APPELLANTS EXHTRTT 2 
Re: Notice of Suspension 
Mr. Richard K. Crandall 
350 South 400 East #114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Mr. Crandall: 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule XX of the 
Revised Rules of the Utah State Bar, you have been 
dropped from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice 
in Utah by reason of your failure to pay your 1987 license 
fee. Notice of this suspension has also been provided 
to all courts within the state. 
A copy of Rule XX, covering suspensions is 
enclosed for your information. It outlines the procedure 
for reinstatement. 
Boat 
Bert 
Ree< 
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Ken 
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Ann 
P DD1 fiDS L2b 
RECEIPT FOR CERTIFIED MAIL 
NO INSURANCE COVERAGE PR0VI0E0 
NOT FOR INTERNATIONAL MAIL 
(See Reverse) 
Sincerely, 
Stephen F'. Hutchinson 
Executive Director 
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MINUTES 
UTAH STATE BAR COMMISSION MEETING 
May 15, 1987 
Carbon Country Club 
Price, Utah 
8:30 a.m. 
Present: were: 
Excused were: 
ITEM I 
ITEM II 
Bert L. Dart, President, presiding; Reed 
L. Martineau, President Elect; Anne M. Stirba, 
Hans Q. Chamberlain, Stewart M. Hanson, Pamela 
T. Greenwood, Kent M. Kasting, Jackson B. 
Howard Commissioners; Robin Riggs, Young 
Lawyers Representative; Dean Edward Spurgeon, 
Ex-Officio; Stephen F. Hutchinson, Executive 
Director; Barbara R. Bassett, Associate 
Director; Christine Burdick, Associate Bar 
Counsel; 
James Z. Davis, Paul M. Durham, Donald B. 
Holbrook, Gordon J. Low, Commissioners; Dean 
Bruce Hafen, Ex-Officio; Norman S. Johnson, 
Past President; 
Meeting commenced at 9:00 a.m. 
Minutes of the April 24 meeting of the Bar 
Commission were reviewed and amended on page 
4 thereof by deleting the last sentence on 
the page. Motion to approve the minutes 
as amended by Commissioner Stirba, second 
by President Elect Martineau. Carried 
unanimously. 
Minutes of the May 5 Executive Committee 
meeting were reviewed for informational 
purposes. President Dart commented on the 
Law Day Committee activity, the national 
mock trial competition, adding that the Bar 
Foundation had stepped in to fund the 
additional activity. 
ITEM III Executive Director's Report 
Executive Director Hutchinson referred the 
members to his written report highlighting 
the following areas: 
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J u l y 8 , 1987 
Mr. Richard K. Crandall 
350 South 400 East, #114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Mr. Crandall: 
As we discussed during our conversation of last week, 
I submitted your petition to the Executive Committee of the 
Board of Commissioners to the Utah State Bar requesting 
that you be reinstated after suspension of non-payment of 
license fees. The Executive Committee felt it would be 
necessary to discuss the matter with the full Commission. 
Their next full meeting is scheduled for July 31, 1987. 
As I explained previously, their is no conditional 
license or Rule that allows you to practice until this 
matter has been resolved. Therefore, please be aware that 
under our Rules you are not eligible to practice law in the 
State of Utah. 
If you have questions, please feel free to contact our 
office. 
Sincerely, J.^-< 
Ju l ee G. S m i l l e y ^ 
' 'Admissions A d m i n i s t r a t o r 
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August 4, 1987 
Mr* Richard K. Crandall 
350 South 400 East, #114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Dear Mr. Crandall: 
Your petition for reinstatement to the bar was 
presented to the Board of Commissioners at their meeting on 
July 31, 1987. I regret to advise ydtT^ that they have 
deferred action on your petition andkjnay, Address the issue 
at the next scheduled meeting on August 28, 1987. 
I need to reiterate that you should not practice law 
in Utah until that reinstatement is complete. There is no 
conditional license that would allow you to practice until 
this matter is settled. 
If you have questions, please feel free to contact our 
office. 
Sincerely, 
G. Smilley 
issions Administrator 
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
April 6, 1987 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale 
Utah State Bar 
425 East First South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Utah State Bar, 
Plaintiff, 
u. Wo. 870079 
Richard K. Crandall, 
Oefendant. 
THIS DAY, The recommendation of the Utah State Bar disciplinary 
action of R. K. Campbell is approved in its entirety. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
m 81387 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: ) RECOMMENDATION OF THE 
) BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
RICHARD K. CRANDALL ) 
) F-239 
The above-captioned matter having come before the Board 
of Commissioners at their regular meeting on the 20th day of 
November, 1987, and the Board having reviewed the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation dated 
November 13, 1987, and being fully advised makes the 
following recommendation: 
That the above-referenced Findings, Conclusions and 
Recommendation of the Hearing Panel of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee be and it hereby is adopted in its 
entirety. 
DATED this JL*^ day of ^ - « ^ > - N 1987. 
{oiuJ^ 
i. Mkstineau 
President 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: 
RICHARD K. CRANDALL 
) 
RECOMMENDATION OF THE 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
F-276 
The above-captioned matter having come before the Board 
of Commissioners at their regular meeting on the 20th day of 
November, 1987, and the Board having reviewed the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation dated 
November 13, 1987, and being fully advised makes the 
following recommendation: 
That the above-referenced Findings, Conclusions and 
Recommendation of the Hearing Panel of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee be and it hereby is adopted in its 
entirety* 
DATED this _2o£^day of , 1987. 
"President 
•ATYOT^KTTYTv T T _. DAfTR 7 
REME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
December 21, 1987 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale 
Utah State Bar 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
In Re: 
No, 870460 
Richard K. Crandall, 
F-276. 
Utah State Bar's order of discipline, having been 
considered, it is ordered that the same be, and hereby is, 
approved. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
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SUPREME COURT ur uihn 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
December 21, 1987 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Richard K. Crandall 
Attorney at Law 
547 West 3900 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
In Re: 
No. 870079 
Richard K. Crandall, 
F-202. 
Utah State Bar's order of discipline, having been 
considered, it is ordered that the same be, and hereby is, 
approved. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
December 21, 1987 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Richard K. Crandall 
Attorney at Law 
547 West 3900 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
In Re: 
No. 870459 
Richard K. Crandall, 
F-239. 
Utah State Bar's order of discipline, having been 
considered, it is ordered that the same be, and hereby is, 
approved. See attached Order. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
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MINUTES 
UTAH STATE BAR COMMISSION MEETING 
October 2, 1987 
Alta, Utah 
Present were: Reed L. Martineau, President 
presiding, Kent M. Kasting, 
President-Elect, Gordon L. Low, 
Randy L. Dryer, Donald B. Holbrook, 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Jackson B. 
Howard, Hans Q. Chamberlain, James 
Z. Davis, Commissioners; Bert L. 
Dart, Past President, Norman S. 
Johnson, ABA Delegate, Stewart 
Hinckley, Young Lawyer's Section 
Representative, Ex-Officio; Stephen 
F. Hutchinson, Executive Director, 
Barbara Bassett, Associate Director, 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, Bar Counsel, 
Christine Burdick, Associate Bar 
Counsel. Excused: Anne M. Stirba, 
Commissioner. 
Meeting commenced at 8:35 a.m. 
Minutes of the August 28 meeting 
of the Bar Commission were reviewed. 
With regard to the judicial item, 
it was reported that President 
Martineau and President-Elect Kasting 
had conferred with the Supreme Court 
expressing the Bar Commission's 
concerns and that President-Elect 
Kasting would follow up with Mr. 
Vickerv. Motion to approve the minutes 
by Commissioner Chamberlain, second 
by Commissioner Greenwood. Carried 
unanimously. 
ITEM II Minutes of the Special Bar Commission 
meeting of September 1 were reviewed. 
Motion to approve as prepared by 
Commissioner Dryer, second by 
Commissioner Holbrook. Carried 
unanimously. 
ITEM I 
(ACTION: 
KASTING) 
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Counsel who referred the Commissioners 
to the written report. 
Formal Complaints: 
F270: Paul Landis, discipline by 
consent. Motion to approve the 
discipline proposed by Commissioner 
Greenwood. second by Commissioner 
Dryer, Carried unanimously. 
F222: Motion to approve the action 
of Bar Counsel in withdrawing the 
complaint and that an apology letter 
be sent by Commissioner Holbrook, 
second by President-Elect Kasting. 
Carried unanimously. 
F202: Richard Crandall. Recusals 
by President Martineau, President-Elect 
Kasting and Commissioner Howard. 
Discussion followed regarding the 
costs involved in appointment of 
a probation supervisor. Motion to 
approve the recommendation conditioned 
on Mr. Cohne electing to serve either 
as probation supervisor or as 
respondent's counsel and that 
respondent consent to the arrangement 
and election by Commissioner Hanson, 
second by Commissioner Dryer. Carried 
unanimously• 
F272: Stanley Balif. Bar Counsel's 
request for authority to petition 
the Supreme Court for interim 
suspension. Motion to approve by 
President-Elect Kasting, second by 
Commissioner Chamberlain. Carried 
unanimously. 
Ms. Burdick presented a progress 
report on the backlog of disciplinary 
cases. 
Private Reprimands 
(0036) Motion to approve by 
Commissioner Greenwood, second by 
Commissioner Dryer. i Carried with 
Commissioner Hanson abstaining. 
(0078) Motion to approve by 
Commissioner Greenwood, second by 
President-Elect Kasting. Carried 
unanimously. 
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Office of Bar Counsel 
425 East First South • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-9077 
October 5, 1987 
Mr. Bruce G. Cohne 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: In Re Richard K. Crandall, F-202 
Dear Mr. Cohne: 
This is to confirm our telephone conversation of 
October 5f 1987. As I indicated to you, the Board of 
Bar Commissioners conditionally approved the Order On 
Order To Show Cause and Recommendation of Discipline in 
the above-referenced matter. The Board approved the 
Recommendation if you will withdraw as counsel of Mr. 
Crandall. The Board believes an inherent conflict of 
interest exists with your acting as probation 
supervisor and counsel, particularly with the potential 
of your being a witness in subsequent proceedings. 
After you have had an opportunity to communicate 
with Mr. Crandall, please advise. If the above is not 
acceptable, I will need to place the matter on the 
Board's agenda for their October 23, 1987, meeting. 
Thank you. 
CAB/jw 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In Re: ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
RICHARD K. CRANDALL ) RECOMMENDATION 
) F-276 
This matter having come on for hearing pursuant to 
notice on November 2, 1987, before a Hearing Panel of the 
Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar, 
comprised of George Speciale, Chairman, Paul Kunz and 
Stanford Darger, at the Utah State Bar Center and the 
Ethics and Discipline Committee being represented by 
Associate Bar Counsel, Christine A. Burdick, and the 
Respondent, Richard K. Crandall, not being present in 
person or through counsel, and the Hearing Panel having 
reviewed the file, and having heard arguments presented, 
and good cause appearing, makes the following Findings, 
Conclusions and Recommendation: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent was served with the Formal Complaint 
and Summons in the above-captioned matter on September 8, 
1987. 
2. The Default Certificate was entered herein on 
September 28, 1987; pursuant to Rule XI(d) of the 
APPFMHTY TT - T>ar»i? 1 1 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, the 
allegations of the Formal Complaint are deemed admitted as 
follows: 
a. In or about April 1986, Sally McCormick 
retained Respondent to draft a legal separation agreement 
and initiate and finalize a divorce action, paying to 
Respondent a retainer in the sum of $1,500.00. 
b. In or about August and September of 1986, 
Respondent drafted and revised a settlement agreement for 
the parties1 signature. 
c. In or about August 1986, Respondent 
represented.to Ms. McCormick that a divorce complaint had 
been filed. 
d. In or about August 1986, Ms. McCormick 
advised Respondent that she was being transferred to 
California in the near future. 
e. From September to the time Ms. McCormick 
filed her complaint in the Office of Bar Counsel on or 
about April 21, 1987, Respondent initiated no contact with 
the Complainant. 
f. From September 1986 to April 1987, Respondent 
failed to return numerous phone calls made to him by Ms. 
McCormick and failed to keep a scheduled appointment in 
January 1987 with Ms. McCormick. 
g. Respondent continually represented to Ms. 
McCormick that the divorce action was pending and that upon 
filing various pleadings and motions, the divorce could be 
finalized. 
h. Respondent failed to file Ms. Mccormick's 
divorce complaint until April 7, 1987, when said divorce 
complaint was filed with the Third Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah as Case No. D-871370. 
i. On or about March 29, 1987, Ms. McCormick 
advised Respondent that she intended to initiate a 
complaint with the Office of Bar Counsel and requested a 
refund of the unused portion of her retainer. 
j. Respondent represented that he would return 
the unused portion of her retainer in the sum of $300.00; 
to this date, Respondent has not returned any monies to Ms. 
McCormick. 
k. Ms. McCormick has now lost residency in Utah 
for purposes of the divorce action. 
1. Respondent failed to respond to the Notice of 
Complaint filed or the Screening Panel of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar and failed to 
appear before said Screening Panel convened to consider 
said Notice of Complaint. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Hearing 
Panel makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Respondent's failure to file the divorce complaint 
on behalf of his client for a period of one year from the 
time he was retained constitutes an unreasonable deLay in 
performing legal services in violation of Canon 6, DR 
6-101(A)(3) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar. 
2e Respondent's failure to file the divorce complaint 
on behalf of his client until after the client had moved to 
California and his failure to complete the divorce action 
as represented constitutes a failure to carry out a 
contract for legal services in violation of Canon 7, DR 
7-101(A)(2) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar, 
3, Respondent knew or should have known that his 
failure to timely file the divorce complaint would and did 
compromise the client's complaint for divorce in Utah, 
which constitutes conduct intentionally prejudicing and/or 
damaging the client in violation of Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)(3) 
of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah 
State Bar. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Panel makes the following: 
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE 
Aggravation; 
1. Respondent's conduct is an amplification of the 
misconduct involved in Formal Complaint F-202 for which 
Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for a 
period of six months. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order of Discipline was mailed certified 
mail return receipt requested to Stanley S. Adams, 
Attorney at Law, 807 East South Temple #101, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84103 on this day of , 
1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Recommendation was mailed to Richard K. Crandall, 
547 West 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 on this 
rS day of 7)cc6*>tJuA--i-lSZl. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Recommendation was mailed to Richard K. Crandall, 
547 West 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 on this 
£ ' day of ^ JW^jl^V-^1987. 
2. Respondent shall pay prior to reinstatement any 
and all costs incurred by the Utah State Bar in the various 
proceedings held in connection with the above-captioned 
matter. 
DATED this 13 day of 1987, 
)e Sg£*£iale, Chairma 
ring Panel of the Ethics 
and Discipline Committee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certi 
foregoing Findings,! 
mailed certified ma 
K. Crandall, 547 We 
84115 on this^? 
FINDINGS OF FACT -F-i 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
IN RE: ORDER OF DISCIPLINE: 
) 
RICHARD K. CRANDALL SUSPENSION 
) 
F-276 
Having reviewed the record in the above-entitled 
matter pursuant to Rule XIV of the Procedures of Discipline 
of the Utah State Bar, and having given due consideration 
to the nature of the misconduct and factors in attendant 
circumstances of Richard K. Crandall, the Court hereby 
approves the recommendation of the Board of Bar 
Commissioners and adopts it as its own and incorporates it 
by reference into this order* 
For having neglected a legal matter entrusted to him 
(in violation of Canon 6, DR 6-101(A)(3), having failed to 
carry out a contract for legal services (in violation of 
Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)(2), and intentionally prejudiced 
and/or damaged his client (in violation of Canon 7, DR 
7-101(A)(3), as they are detailed in the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That Richard K. Crandall be suspended from the 
practice of law for six (6) months and a day, said period 
to run consecutively to the period of suspension 
recommended in F-239; 
2. That he pay restitution of $15,000.00 to Sally 
McCormick on or before February 1, 1988, with interest paid 
from November 2, 1987, at a rate of 12%; 
3. That if restitution is not made as ordered, an 
Order to Show Cause shall issue requiring Mr. Crandall to 
appear before a Hearing Panel to show cause why an 
additional sanction should not be imposed; 
4. That Mr. Crandall shall pay the costs incurred by 
the Utah State Bar in its prosecution of this matter and 
that no petition for reinstatement shall be favorably 
considered unless the costs and restitution are paid. 
The effective date of this suspension shall be the day 
after the (6) six month and (1) one day suspension period 
imposed in F-239. 
2/-**-Dated this £-1 day of / VQ^^c^t^yfr^^ 1987. 
By the Court: 
'^y^^V^ ^ 
^Gordon R. Hall 
Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar: 
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; 
and 
3. Respondent violated Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(6) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar:- A 
lawyer shall not engage in any other conduct that adversely 
reflects on his ability to practice law. 
ORDER OF DISCIPLINE 
1. Respondent shall be placed on Probation for one (1) 
year commencing upon the date of entry of this order and 
subject to the following conditions: 
A* Joseph Palmer, an attorney in good standing of the 
Utah- State Bar, and recommended by the Board of 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, shall serve as a 
probation supervisor to-monitor Respondent's activities 
during the Probation period. 
B* Respondent shall file a written status report with 
his probation supervisor within thirty (30) days of the Utah 
Supreme Court's approval of these Recommendations. The 
status report shall include cumulative index, listing all of 
Respondent's cases which are not completed and not closed. 
Respondent shall complete a detailed status report on each 
case which is not completed and not closed. Respondent and 
his probation supervisor shall discuss this Probation, 
clarify any ambiguities and arrange a date that the status 
reports are due each month and/or bi-monthly. 
C. Respondent shall meet with and file the status 
report with his probation supervisor every two (2) weeks for 
the first two (2) months of the Probation. 
D. During the remaining ten (10) months of the 
Probation, Respondent shall meet with and file the status 
reports with his probation supervisor every thirty (30) 
days. 
E* Respondent and the probation supervisor shall 
report to Bar Counsel every thirty (30) days on the progress 
of the Probation. 
F. Respondent shall reimburse the Utah State Bar the 
amount of its costs incurred in pursuing this matter within 
thirty (30) days entry of this order. 
2. Respondent's probation supervisor shall file an 
affidavit with Bar Counsel within ten (10) days of 
Respondent's breach of any term of Probation or a breach of 
any of the specific terms agreed upon between Respondent and 
the probation supervisor. 
3. If Respondent breaches any term of this Probation 
Order or the specific terms agreed upon between Respondent 
and his probation supervisor, the Hearing Committee Panel 
will reconvene to consider appropriate courses of action. 
DATED this day of , 1987. 
By the Court: 
Gordon R. Hall 
participation by Sections in CLE 
programs, and discussed the affirmative 
and negative aspects of financial 
participation and the use of funds 
by Sections. The proposed policy 
statement is to be' amended to provide 
for administrative appeals to the Bar 
Commission and for further clarification 
in the area o£ joint programs with 
outside entities* 
b. Staff Travel: Summary was presented 
and is appended to these minutes. 
c. ABA Conference on Professionalism: 
Mr. Hutchinson recommended participation 
in the upcoming ABA conference on 
professionalism in Denver. Motion 
(Action Martineau, to approve attendance by President 
Kasting) Elect Martineau or Commissioner Kasting 
by President Elect Martineau, second 
by Commissioner Greenwood. Carried 
unanimously. 
d. Suspensions: Mr. Hutchinson presented 
a list of attorneys who were suspended 
for non payment of dues and petitions 
o£ two attorneys who had requested 
reinstatement and had submitted the 
appropriate fees. Motion to approve 
the reinstatements pursuant to the 
petitions by Commissioner Chamberlain, 
second by President Elect Martineau. 
Carried unanimously. Motion to 
authorize the Executive Committee 
to approve reinstatements of petitioning 
attorneys suspended for non payment 
of license fees by Commissioner Hanson, 
second by Commissioner Kasting. Carried 
unanimously. 
e. Committees and Sections: Mr. Hutchinson 
presented a list of proposed Committee 
Chair assignments as prepared by the 
Committee on Committees. President 
Elect Martineau requested input from 
the Commissioners regarding their 
respective liaisons. Motion to approve 
the appointment of the Committee Chairs 
as recommended by the Committee by 
Commissioner Kasting, second by 
Commissioner Chamberlain. Carried 
unanimously. 
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